NEW TIMES

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The Jackal is Hiding in Syria

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A SOVIET WEEKLY

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

Washington was the first to learn about the putsch – two months before it happened. *NT* discloses the mystery of an encounter between Alexander Bessmertnykh and James Baker

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

Terrorist Number One has been sought for 16 years. First he concealed himself in East Berlin, now he's hiding in Syria

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From our mailbag

■ Several former members of Riga OMON units (Interior Ministry troops) were arrested by the Latvian police in the town of Surgut (Tyumen Region) and transported back to Latvia.

The Memorial society as well as the democratic masses of this country strongly condemned the military operations of the Riga riot troops. Obviously, all those guilty of attacking state institutions and citizens of the Latvian Republic should be punished.

Still, it seems to us that the arrest of the members of the Riga riot troops on the territory of the Russian Federation and their subsequent transportation to the territory of the Latvian Republic was carried out in violation of the law.

Thus, Article 10 of the Law on USSR Citizenship, adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet on May 23, 1990, says: "A citizen of the USSR cannot be extradited to any foreign country." It should be stressed that this law is operating on the territory of the Russian Federation. Russia has not declared its wish to secede from the USSR. Nor has it proclaimed its independence, and so far it has not adopted its own law on citizenship. The Latvian Republic, on the other hand, has been recognized as an independent state (September 1991) by the USSR State Council and as such is a foreign country.

The members of OMON units, who moved to live in Tyumen Region, were never citizens of an independent Latvian state. If those people took illegal actions on the territory of Latvia, they, since their last place of residence was the territory of the Russian Federation, should be called to account according to the laws of the USSR and the Russian Federation.

The reference made by the RSFSR Procurator's Office to the effect that the Russian and Latvian procurator's offices concluded in May 1991 an agreement on cooperation in the search for and transportation of criminals has no legal grounds. The agreement was concluded within the framework of a single USSR. And, after the declaration of the Latvian Republic's independence, this agreement (as regards some of its provisions) has come to contravene the USSR legislation.

Article 51 of the Law On the USSR Citizenship does make an exception to the principle stipulated by Article 10 of the same law, provided there are international agreements concluded at interstate or intergovernmental levels. No relev-

A boor in power

■ Impudence as a means of acquiring political dividends is becoming the vogue of our times, though vulgar ways of behavior in politics were popular as far back as the Khrushchev era – suffice it to recall his manipulations with his boot at a UN session. Presently, it is Mr Zhirinovsky who is the successor to that fashion and who showed that six million people – the social base he leans on in Russia – wholly support loutishness. Zhirinovsky's main trump card is not so much his absurdly demagogic programme, but his behavior and the insolent way in which he casts aside all the proprieties, which so impress his supporters. Unfortunately, there are not a few people in our society who are crazy about boorishness and who admire and respect impudence as a manifestation of strength...

On September 18 Russian TV broadcast a programme called *Two questions put to President Nixon*. The authors of the telecast tried very hard to create the impression among the TV viewers that the USSR President had a hand in the August putsch. Though Vladimir Bukovsky's arguments were not very convincing, I nonetheless do not deny his right to voice his contentions before a millions-strong audience. But I do not know what accomplishments of the PRE-GORBACHEV period could justify political analyst Olshansky's sadistic ruthlessness under the guise of which he, without waiting for the end of the investigation, displayed his "analysis" for everybody's savouring. And by what right did the programme's anchor man take the liberty to trample underfoot the presumption of innocence by setting masses against Mikhail Gorbachev? For it was Gorbachev who, in 1985, started and went on with the shattering of the party and government colossus. All these years his enemies have been watching his errors and mistakes so that they could expose them at the most trying moment for this country, with the sole aim of ridiculing Gorbachev before the public. Their hour of triumph has struck and now they can cry out loud: "Crucify him!"

The politicized and perceptive minds stop at nothing to expose ominous conspiracies and high intrigues hatched by Jewish Freemasonry, apparatchiks, Gorbachev, and others. Contrary to this practice, I would dare to stress that our society has entered that stage of its development when the most dramatic events take place before everybody's eyes. Those who, in search of some hidden phenomena, are prone not to notice the ongoing processes probably would not understand my anxiety over possible variants of Russia's future. The ochlocracy, i.e., mob rule, is one of them. Once yes-men and riff-raff come to power, they would use to their advantage all the sacrosanct niches of the social pyramid. The risk of those people taking power will be especially great when they hold the top governmental posts: generals will get armies and leaders will rely on paid gunmen, déclassé elements and fanatical youths. No political regime can be insured against the possibility of ochlocracy, which is not the form of government but rather its essence. Only the democratic system is able to prevent criminal cliques from coming to power.

Sergei Mitrokhin,
Institute of Humanitarian and Political Research

Moscow, USSR

"The coup has been carried out not by the State Emergency Committee members, but by the President and the government of the Russian Federation"

OMON are our men and it is our prerogative to try them or not...

"No wish to work to the detriment of the people"

ant agreement has been signed by Latvia either with the USSR or the Russian Federation.

The human rights Memorial society has appealed to the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the Russian Federation as well as to the USSR and RSFSR procurator's offices to launch an investigation as regards the extradition of the USSR citizens to the Latvian Republic.

Interrepublican Memorial society, Human Rights Centre

■ The August coup was carried out not by the State Emergency Committee members, but by the President and the government of the Russian Federation. The Russian President appointed himself commander-in-chief, called for strikes and mass civil disobedience, up to armed struggle. The Committee's attempts to suppress the mutiny were legal because its aim was to protect the state from an inner evil. The Moscow civil rebellion prevented the Union leaders from fulfilling their duties; and the Russian President and the three young men killed during those days have become heroes. But the real heroes were the Committee's members who, lawfully and in keeping with their sense of duty, came out with the institution of a state of emergency in order to normalize the situation in the country. If the Russian President is not a self-styled commander-in-chief, then the State Emergency Committee members are not impostors either. And if the Russian government leaders are not rebels, the Committee members are likewise not putschists. If it is right to proclaim the sovereignty of a republic, ignoring the USSR President, then naturally a state of emergency can be introduced in any region or republic. The creators of the new Union have betrayed the old one. As for the State Emergency Committee members, they have not pledged their allegiance to this new Union.

V.Kozlov
Zhigulyovsk, USSR

THE WAY I SEE IT



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

■ I have been working as a radio engineer at various defence industry plants for forty years. A year and a half ago I retired as I could not go on labouring for no purpose, not for the public's good, but rather to its detriment.

But this is not the reason which prompted me to write to you. Please convey my deep gratitude to your journalist Simon Soloveichik. Though my pension is not that much, I nevertheless subscribed to *New Times* with the sole purpose of reading his articles. I trust him. Soloveichik tries to be sincere, and that is why everything that he writes sounds very convincing. I think he loves our children whose trust could be won only by explaining things to them honestly, without lies. It would have been nice to broadcast Soloveichik's express analysis of the current events in our country over radio and TV. Our new democratic leaders need a bit of prompting to make wise decisions. Various dialogues and round-table discussions, involving such honest and intelligent persons as Vasily Selyunin, Boris Pinsker, Simon Soloveichik, Pavel Bunich and Evgeny Ambartsumov, would be very useful in this respect.

R.Yakhontov
Novosibirsk, USSR

■ General Vlasov is undoubtedly a tragic figure of recent history as, likewise, are the times he lived in. I would not agree with those who so easily call him a traitor. We still know very little about those times. I strongly beleive that Vlasov did not fight against his own people. It is not right to identify people with a regime. In those days the Stalinist regime reigned supreme and waged an extermination war against its own people.

Arnold Anuchkin-Timofeyev, Cand. Sc. (History)
Moscow, USSR

***Compiled by* Tatiana Chernova**

MEMORY DAY OF THE VICTIMS OF COMMUNISM

■ The day of November 7, 1991, and the 74th anniversary of the so-called Great October Revolution, the grave consequences of which are practically impossible to comprehend, are not far off.

Physical extermination of over 60 million people, the blood spilled and tears shed, as well as crippled souls and oft-repeated lies about "bright communism..." As a result we now face the total collapse of the totalitarian system and look for a way out of the catastrophic situation. Be that as it may, not so long ago we were the participants of a very cynical farce when on November 7 thousands-strong crowds of people living in the "land of socialism" were driven to gather on Red Square to say thanks for their "happy life" to their conceited leaders.

We do not know how November 7 will be celebrated in the future, but we, Americans of Russian descent, despite many years of wandering, never stopped loving our Motherland and still remember all the sufferings our compatriots endured. We, as well as our children and grandchildren born and brought up in America, will always remember the tragic events of November 7(October 25), 1917, and commemorate this date as the **MEMORY DAY OF THE VICTIMS OF COMMUNISM.**

Commemorating this fatal – for Russia and also for the whole of mankind – anniversary, we will not forget in our prayers all those killed during the civil war, and all those tortured and spiritually crippled in later years. We will remind everybody about Russia's tragedy and tell what awaits people if they forget God and his commandment to love thy neighbour.

We, therefore, appeal to the Russian people and all other nations, who want to be free from communism, not to repeat the past mistakes (for which too high a prize was paid), to stop internecine wars as well as interethnic and religious strife, to set aside discord and offence in the name of the fallen victims and future generations, and to embark upon the path of mutual respect and understanding, and cooperation.

Congress of Russian Americans

NT INVESTIGATES

The mystery of two putsches

What Alexander Bessmertnykh keeps quiet about and what our correspondent learned in Washington

Galina Sidorova,
NT political analyst

There is something that all participants in the August events prefer to keep silent about, even the most talkative ones, regardless of whether they work in the Kremlin or await trial at Moscow's Matrosskaya Tishina prison. Some of them may start talking at the trial. Others may wait until they have retired, and still others will never talk. Such are the laws of politics, the laws of half-truths which the rulers use in their relations with the ruled. In this country, these laws are observed more meticulously than anywhere. Will we ever live to know the truth about the August putsch? I do not think so. History has seen many an example that the whole truth rarely becomes known. Even today there appear new versions of the John F. Kennedy's assassination. At the same time, political secrets have one specific feature: sometimes they unexpectedly come to the surface. This is what happened to the secret that the former Foreign Minister of the USSR, Alexander Bessmertnykh, is still trying to keep, the secret which I happened to involuntarily witness in its inception in June 1991, although at that time I did not really suspect anything.

Berlin, June 20

The former Soviet Embassy in Berlin, now the Berlin branch of the Soviet Embassy in Bonn. I had just returned from the joint news conference of Bessmertnykh and Baker, at which the ministers announced that the START Treaty was almost ready for signing. My job done, I sat down to relax in a cosy old arm-chair near the main staircase of the Embassy. Was there anything I could expect from the Minister, one more briefing, for example? As I sat there thinking, the Foreign Minister of Cyprus strode past me to meet Bessmertnykh in the latter's office. I was almost ready to follow the example of other journalists and go, when suddenly Bessmertnykh appeared from a side corridor, his face a mask of anxiety. I do not think he noticed me at all. Several top diplomats from the Embassy staff trotted behind him. One of them asked me whether I had seen Bessmertnykh's deputy whom they were looking for. I knew where the deputy was, but I did not tell them. Actually, the deputy had allowed himself some time to go out, knowing that the bulk of the work had been done and the Minister did not need him. Not finding his deputy, the Minister took a senior expert in US affairs with him and went out to the Embassy inner yard through the back door. A second later I heard the screech of the opening gates and the rustling of the tyres of the ministerial limousine.

One floor up, the unsuspecting Cypriot Minister was chatting with Soviet diplomats waiting for Bessmertnykh to appear from the adjacent room. What happened? It took several months and the August putsch before I knew the answer.

Alexander Bessmertnykh took measures to inform Gorbachev

Lake Naroch. August 18

Alexander Bessmertnykh was taking a stroll in a forest in a two- hour drive from Minsk, Byelorussia, making plans for a grand fishing expedition,. when his assistants found him and said he was to phone to Moscow. When he got to the phone, Bessmertnykh was told that KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov wanted to speak to him. Bessmertnykh asked to be connected with the KGB chairman. Kryuchkov said he was to come to Moscow "to discuss one serious matter" and that a special military plane reserved for the

James Baker warned about the coup

commander of the local military district was already on its way to collect the Minister and take him to Moscow.

Bessmertnykh says that very often it was Kryuchkov who phoned him to inform him of emergencies. The Minister assured his wife that he would be back the next day to continue the vacation and, accompanied by a bodyguard, flew to Moscow. An approaching thunderstorm nearly delayed their departure, but the plane managed to take off. Around 12 p.m. on August 18, Bessmertnykh appeared in the Kremlin, wearing a windjacket and a pair of jeans.

The Kremlin office

Whose office was he taken to?

"I later wondered myself," Bessmertnykh said, "and at that time I just did not give it much thought. All big Kremlin offices look alike. It was a huge office of a big boss. There were portraits of Lenin and Marx on the walls. I saw a big green table and sitting around it were members of the state and CPSU leadership, including the Interior Minister, the Minister of Defence, Boldin, Shenin, Yanayev, Pavlov and Lukyanov. The place of the chairman was vacant. I apologized for the way I looked and sat down at the end of the table, waiting for someone to inform me about some serious catastrophe. An uncomfortable silence set in..."

Vladimir Kryuchkov appeared as if form nowhere to talk with Bessmertnykh. The KGB chairman asked the Minister to come with him to the next room and said: "The situation in the country is critical and bordering on chaos. It has been decided to impose a state of emergency in the country. A special state committee is being set up to maintain the state of emergency, and it has been suggested that you join it." Bessmertnykh's first question to Kryuchkov was: "Has Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev so decided?" Kryuchkov answered: "Mikhail Sergeyevich is seriously ill and can barely move. The committee will be headed by Yanayev." Bessmertnykh said: "I will not join the committee," and Kryuchkov replied: "You must..." The KGB chairman produced a folder containing the list of committee members and Bessmertnykh immediately noticed his name on it. "I took a blue pen out of my pocket and crossed my name out," says Bessmertnykh. "After that we returned to the big office, and Kryuchkov announced: 'Bessmertnykh has refused.'"

Bessmertnykh heard Kryuchkov phoning someone and saying the same.

"Whom did he call?"

"I don't know."

"Didn't you suspect anything fishy that night?"

"I saw Gorbachev's closest entourage at the conference, including Boldin, Plekhanov and other state and party leaders. The question of a state of emergency had been repeatedly raised before at various sittings. Actually, the question was in the air..."

Was what Bessmertnykh heard on August 19 in the Kremlin entirely unexpected for him?

When his wife arrived from Minsk a day later, Bessmertnykh told her that he had refused to become a member of the emergency committee, that he could be fired at any time, and that other troubles might be coming. He told his wife not to go out with their little son Arseny, because he "did not know what those people might be up to." His family decided not to eat the dinners which are brought to Soviet leaders in sealed canisters.

On August 19, Bessmertnykh sent telegrams to Soviet embassies, saying that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was shaped by the constitutional bodies of power. The emergency committee was not listed among such bodies. Bessmertnykh insists the telegram said enough for a clever ambassador to understand what the situation was like. At approximately the same time most embassies received official documents from the emergency committee via TASS.

In the evening of the same day Bessmertnykh was ill with an onset of gallstones, and on August 20 he followed the developments from his home. A document of the emergency committee was brought to him for signing. It was to be circulated by TASS after that. The document was "the Soviet leadership"'s response to the August 19 statement of President Bush: "The attempts by the US President to portray the emergency measures of the Soviet leadership aimed at stabilizing the situation in the country as unconstitutional cannot fail to produce a great amount of concern. Obviously, the US President, with his rich experience, must know that any sovereign state has certain procedures to independently determine the legality of various steps in domestic policy. Actually, this is

not the first time the United States chooses to ignore this inseparable right of independent states. Suffice it to recall Grenada and Panama... Even greater indignation is caused by the support voiced by the US President to direct instigation to unlawful actions by certain politicians in the Soviet Union. Only recently the US Administration noted the immoral behaviour of such politicians pushing the country towards civil war. Today, however, the US Administration is virtually trying to undermine the appearing national concord..."

Bessmertnykh wrote on the statement:

"I cannot agree with the contents of this statement which can aggravate Soviet-American relations and the situation around this country." The document with Bessmertnykh's note was sent back to the emergency committee.

Strangely, at the press conference after the putsch Bessmertnykh chose not to mention that he had crossed his name off the list of emergency committee members: according to him, he wanted to report this to the President first.

The climax came on August 23. Says Bessmertnykh: "Gorbachev called me using the direct phone line. There were voices in his office. He said, 'I've been told that you were passive during these three days.' I replied: 'This is not so, but if you prefer to put it like that, I am to resign, aren't I?' 'Yes, Alexander, you have to resign in these circumstances.'"

During this short conversation, neither Gorbachev nor Bessmertnykh mentioned a certain event that happened two months before August 23. Both must have remembered it, though. Several days after his resignation, Bessmertnykh sent a letter to Gorbachev, in which, as he said himself, he "described in detail the events of the tragic days in order to restore the good name of the diplomatic service and himself." I suggested that this letter be published in *New Times*. After a moment's pause, Bessmertnykh said he could not publish the letter before he got an answer from Gorbachev. He has not heard from the President since then. Shortly after that, however, there was some talk about Bessmertnykh's possible return to the diplomatic service, but he decided that "the best option for him was to withdraw from the government and remain on the other side."

Berlin. June 20

Where did Bessmertnykh go that day? It did not take me long to discover that James Baker had called him. However, the Soviet Minister returned from the Secretary of State's residence only an hour before James Baker's call.



The Berlin branch of the Soviet Embassy in Germany. On June 20 Bessmertnykh left this building through the back door, heading for the secret meeting with James Baker

Soon Bessmertnykh returned to the Embassy the same way that he had left – through the back door. With a stony expression on his face, he proceeded to meet the Cypriot. My stroll about Berlin was frustrated and my staying at the Embassy a little longer did not produce any additional information. The Minister kept silent. As we flew to Moscow the next day, I bluntly asked him about the reason for his urgent meeting with James Baker. At first the Minister pretended not to understand, but when he realized that there was no use pretending, he referred to some unsettled details of the future START Treaty. It became evident that the Minister was not going to tell the truth.

Washington. October 17

The secret was blown up five months later at Washington's Watergate Hotel.

My American interlocutor, whom I have long known as a person belonging to the Washington corridors of power, told me that on that day in Berlin, Baker wanted to meet Bessmertnykh to discuss something other than the latest achievements at the START talks or any outstanding problem of Soviet-American affairs. Baker spoke about what was to happen in Moscow. The Secretary of State warned Bessmertnykh about the planned coup and probably even mentioned the names of the plotters.

Moscow. October 31

Will Alexander Bessmertnykh answer my question s this time?

"Yes, that day in Berlin I really left the Embassy through the back gates. All German guards were at the front gates and did not see me leaving. I took one person with me, but Baker and I talked confidentially, not even the interpreters were present. When he called me, Baker asked me to come as soon as possible. He apologized for being unable to come himself: the secret service people wouldn't allow him to come without guards and there were too many people around. I heard something unusual in his voice."

"What was it?"

"He sounded too anxious, although the reason for the meeting was absolutely impossible to guess from the conversation. He asked me to come incognito, if I could. Later we thought up a plausible explanation in case someone learned that we met."

"Did Baker really warn you?"

"Yes, he did so, referring to intelligence sources."

"When did you inform Gorbachev? When you returned to Moscow?"

"There was no time to lose. When I was still in Berlin, I took the necessary measures to convey this information to the President."

"By phone?"

"Not exactly. The direct phone line is



One of the KGB facilities in Moscow where the putschists are suspected to have held meetings. Who leaked information to the CIA?

protected from foreign intelligence, but not from Soviet intelligence."

"What means of communication did you use, then?"

"I can't answer this. Later, when I returned from Berlin, I discussed this with the President."

"How did Gorbachev react?"

"He was obviously alarmed, but he did not look like a man in panic."

"Did you ever return to the June warning later?"

"No."

"What about the Americans? For instance, when Bush was in Moscow?"

"No."

It seemed to me that Bessmertnykh wanted to stay loyal to Gorbachev and to be tactful to Baker who had not yet spoken up officially on the matter. Bessmertnykh told me that in the history of Soviet-American relations, Moscow had shared similar information with Washington, demonstrating the highest level of confidence.

Moscow informed the United States about possible troubles for the US President...

In the summer of 1989, the former KGB chairman, Vladimir Kryuchkov, also spoke about cooperation with the US intelligence in such spheres as efforts against terrorism, drug trafficking and nuclear proliferation. Said Kryuchkov: "If we receive information that somebody's life is in danger, we try to immediately convey this information to the other party. The other party also informs us in such situations. After all, human life is of the greatest value..."

The fact that the US President did not come to any trouble suggests that the Americans used our information better than we used their warnings. On the other hand, no one can be sure what would have happened if the threat to George Bush had come from the CIA director.

Versions

The American warning was meant to inform Gorbachev in advance about Prime Minister Pavlov's demarche in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, when the latter demanded himself extraordinary presidential powers. The Pavlov demarche was supported by the old threesome: Pugo, Yazov and Kryuchkov, who explained why a state of emergency was necessary. There was really no time to lose and the Americans were very concerned. I think the Pavlov demarche was the beginning of the putsch the Americans warned Bessmertnykh about. It was Putsch Number One. This putsch had been planned to happen smoothly and with no victims – in the form of a constitutional coup. At that time the conservative faction Soyuz dominated the Soviet parliament, and Chairman Lukyanov was firmly in control of the Supreme Soviet. Something went wrong, though. Perhaps Pavlov's energetic demand scared some vacillating deputies. Perhaps deputies were alarmed by seeing the trio act as one. Plus, Gorbachev's art of political manoeuvre also helped save the situation. Gorbachev could have been spurred by a sense of reality, the realization that the Americans knew everything and if he did not check the "Pavlovites," the US would give no credits, and normal relations with America would be finished.

What happened next does not fit the pattern: especially the strange behaviour of two people on the Soviet side who knew about the American warning.

The anxiety and fear which Bessmertnykh sensed, although he must have been prepared for what he heard in the Kremlin on August 18, can have only one explanation, I think. He might have been uncertain about Gorbachev's role in the events and wondered what side the President was on. Gorbachev knew about the plot, but he did not fire any of the plotters. He did not even react to the demarche of the KGB chairman who, when speaking at the Supreme Soviet, accused him of having surrounded himself with CIA "agents of influence." It must be recalled that after Kryuchkov's speech, *New Times* demanded that he resign on grounds of disloyalty to the President.

Was the President too sure that the situation was under his control? On receiving the American warning, he might have summoned the plotters and talked to them in the language which Soviet apparatchiks understand so well: "I know everything about you, so watch out..." Then came the period of successes: the Bush visit, the London summit of the Group of Seven, the finalizing of the Union Treaty... Gorbachev relaxed and left for vacation at Foros...

In any case, the Berlin episode with the US warning confirms that the August putsch in Moscow could not have been a plot Gorbachev's aides thought up over a cup of tea. It was at least the second thoroughly planned attempt to bring the nation back to the totalitarian impasse. This attempt left too many questions.

And now one more question has been added to them: who informed the Americans about the coming coup?

Photo by the author and from Zeit-magazin (Germany)

"We are not kamikazes"

Russia's State Secretary **Gennady BURBULIS** answers the questions posed by *New Times* analyst **Gennady Ariyevich**

New Times. The power of the democrats still hasn't made life easier for common people. Do you really hope that things will change for the better after the Congress of Russian People's Deputies?

Gennady Burbulis. The present economic malady, grave though it is, can be cured. For the first time all three prerequisites for the remedy are present: President Yeltsin's political will and authority; professionals from our team who are both willing and capable of carrying out reforms; and the majority's psychological readiness for them. The people seem to be convinced at last that it's impossible to survive without reforms...

NT. The programme proposed by Yeltsin still resembles a declaration of intentions. How realistic is it?

G.B. A detailed priority schedule – a time-table, so to speak – is being worked out for practically each area of the reform. Reforms require a whole set of correlated measures – legal ones, information and psychological ones, and those concerning the personnel. Steps must be taken to neutralize resistance to reforms on the part of the revanchists whose positions have been strengthened. The putsch did its best to help the state monopoly of the CPSU structures collapse but the poison accumulated in it has permeated all vitally important cells of the Russian state. In no time former functionaries of Party regional and city committees filled all levels of power, including executive power. On the local level the President's will encounters serious resistance from those who are still convinced that it is possible to emerge from the crisis using traditional Soviet methods – hard work, pulling and pressing – leaving untouched the personal attitudes of people, their interests and motivation to work. This explains why a full-fledged system of presidential power must be created.

NT. Yeltsin demanded that the congress grant him extraordinary authority. Does this mean a temporary introduction of presidential rule?

G.B. Legally and politically presidential rule implies extending additional volitional and legal possibilities. It's unjust and insulting to label as extraordinary rule an attempt to use the President's constitutional rights in full.

NT. Who has worked out the economic programme for Russia? Evidently, not the government in which there are too many conservatives, especially in the agrarian sector...

G.B. The basic ideas were already formulated in the programme 500 Days. Yavlinsky and Shatalin, wherever they happen to work at the moment, remain the present programme's co-authors together with that part of the government which has fought for radical change – Minister of Economics Saburov, Press Minister Poltoranin, Minister of Justice Fyodorov, Labour Minister Shohin. And, finally, the group headed by Director of the Institute for Economic Policy Yegor Gaidar which worked in Arkhangelskoye. The work in store for us must be fulfilled primarily by young people who nevertheless have an elementary knowledge of how the economy works in other countries.

NT. A government which is going to implement radical reforms – necessary yet unpopular – assumes the role of a kamikaze. Why should Yeltsin undertake to head such a government?

G.B. I don't like the sacrificial implication inherent in this word. A total and far-reaching offensive on the past for the sake of the future requires an exact distribution of functions. The government must walk its path to the end and be proud of it, for the purpose of any power structure is to solve human problems and not to enjoy power in comfort.

As concerns Boris Nikolayevich... Yeltsin would cease to be himself if he



The new scheme of executive power in Russia

Boris Yeltsin creates a hard power structure in the republic. He has been granted the right to decide for himself how to reorganize the top bodies of executive power. A one-year moratorium has been declared on referendums and elections in Russia's autonomies. Economic reform takes precedence over all others.

shunned responsibility, although the risk is tremendous.

NT. Only a very popular government can afford to take unpopular measures. People have begun to lose trust in the authorities during the two months of silence, discord and uncertainty in the leadership.

G.B. This should be treated with discretion. Never before has the entire society's attention been rivetted so much on the figure of the President and his team. Hence the exaggerated assessments of our possibilities and intolerance of the absence of noticeable and quick improvements in our life. We might have acted more quickly and effectively, if the fruit of Russian statehood had ripened.

NT. And why did the government disappear from political life for two months?

G.B. We had to prepare the "construction site" – the Union Treaty before August and the interrepublican economic agreement after it. We had been accumulating strength for an attack in a certain direction but the three days in August turned everything around. It was a forced pause for reappraisal of the situation and choosing a new direction.

NT. Some are under the impression that there is a division of roles among the Russian leadership. Yeltsin speaks about interrepublican cooperation, the Union Treaty, a common economic and political space; whereas the State Council is preoccupied with Russia's national interests. And you simply stated that an economic agreement was not so profitable for the Russian Federation.

G.B. It's true in a way. But the opposite is also true – the final text of the agreement has been considerably improved by the efforts of the President himself and the majority of the State Council. Boris Nikolayevich has invariably confirmed Russia's readiness to participate in the agreement but by no means to the detriment of its people's interests. The President chooses the most fitting decision, taking into account the entire spectrum of views of both the deputies and his advisors.

NT. What do you think of the accusations that the former Sverdlovsk Party apparatchiks are concentrated in the Russian Parliament?

G.B. This isn't true! I think that these accusations are a result of this supersensitive attitude to the President's activity and excessively close attention to his person.

NT. Doesn't the State Council replace the government and even the parliament?

G.B. How can it replace the parliament if it doesn't issue laws? It simply works out recommendations for the President on the decisions to be made. How can the State Council replace the government if it doesn't control anything or sign any documents? Many don't understand the very idea of creating a body which works out the state policy. A state without a political strategy cannot be a full-fledged one. Nor can a reform be successful if it is not backed by a political analysis and a prognosis of the situation. In this sense the State Council is a structure indispensable for any regime. Its functioning wouldn't have been so noticeable in a normal economic and political situation.

NT. Does this mean that a strong government doesn't need a State Council so much?

G.B. In the period of radical reforms or after them the State Council will be seriously reformed, too, and its members will possibly be incorporated into government structures. However, it should be borne in mind that the presidency provides for an essential separation of state and political leadership and control over economic life.

NT. What's your attitude towards the republics' negative reaction to Russia's behaviour?



Drawing by Valentin Mokiyevsky

G.B. These assessments are due to the painful and, to many, not easily understandable process of the disintegration of the totalitarian system. It is not a question of republican leaders' personal interestedness, nor that of exploiting the national issue. It is a historical problem of searching for a way out of unhealthy and unnatural conditions to which normal approaches are inapplicable. You are faced here with exaggerated ethnic sensitivity, an extremely complicated psychological motivating milieu aggravating the conflict, and fear of the unknown, and a naive belief that the more compact and the more isolated a human community is the more healthy it becomes. The society's madness should not be discounted either. Besides, the collapsing communist regime takes advantage of the national issue to sow agitation among the people and win their votes. The only way to cope with the problem is not to make haste with political assessments of these phenomena until they take a rational form. It must be realized at last that attempts to achieve national self-determination are motivated by economic problems still unsolved. We will attain greater clarity in other matters when we work out a clear and definite economic policy.

However, the republics are now inclined to incriminate with imperial ambitions not the Union but Russia. We have to convince everybody that Russia creates a principally new democratic state, simultaneously preventing Russia from losing its statehood; we must find the exact measure of Russia's real sovereignty and real economic independence without traumatizing all those who create their own states nearby with no less pain and effort.

I am sure that this entire process would have been much less painful if God Almighty had been merciful enough to endow us – politicians big and small – with an understanding of a simple truth – a state that has outlived itself historically cannot be reanimated. Therefore, the more precisely formulated our aim is – a union of sovereign states – the more steadily and consistently will the republics march to the same goal. So far we haven't abandoned attempts to achieve a strange and ambiguous aim – to preserve a constitutional state within the framework of which it will be ostensibly possible to create a full-fledged union of sovereign states.

Are there grounds for ethnic conflicts in Moscow?

Taximen against Caucasians in Moscow. Fiction and reality

Irrespective of its motives, the riot of Moscow taximen against Caucasians staying in the city is a sad proof of the social tensions in our society and its economic immaturity. Taximen, who work mostly for themselves, almost as under capitalism, rose against those who manage to earn more. And this was done very much in the socialist way...

Formally, everything began on October 23. On that day two unknown persons attacked a taxi-cab returning from Domodedovo airport near the capital. The cab was driven by Matveyev from the 18th taxi pool. Killing the driver (his body was later discovered on the 21st kilometre of the Kashira highway), the murderers tried to break away from police pursuit, but smashed into a post and died. The identity card of some Makaradze from the Adjar autonomous republic in Georgia was found in the car. It turned out later that the murderers had robbed this man the day before. The identity of the criminals and their ethnic origin could not be established. Someone said they were Azerbaijanians. It is difficult to ascertain now who said so. The taximen with whom *New Times* reporters talked refer to an unknown driver who saw the criminals at the wheel and called the highway police.

On October 25, when the funeral of the murdered taximan was held, several dozen cabs lined up across the Novoarbatsky Avenue near the mayor's office and demanded that the city authorities ensure the safety of taximen in the evening hours and strengthen public order at airports and railway terminals. Since the murderers were rumoured to be Azerbaijanians the taximen urged the authorities to evict all Caucasian natives from Moscow. Those gathered were received by Grigory Yavlinsky.

Several days after the funeral, taxi-cabs lined up across Tverskaya Street. Russian Federation's Interior Minister Dunayev, who met with the striking drivers, promised to form a special commission to examine their demands and take appropriate measures. But apparently the taximen were not satisfied with the minister's promise.

As more taximen joined the protest, more demands were put forward. These were mainly economic and social demands: the improvement of repair facilities for taxi-cabs, higher wages, retirement on pension at the age of 55, the purchase of foreign cars for taxi-cabs in which a special glass to shield the driver from passengers and a convenient door block system could be installed.

In the morning of October 28 about 250 taximen gathered in 100 cars on Sovetskaya Square, in the central part of Moscow. In half an hour ten taxi-cabs blocked Tverskaya Street. By midday they headed for Manezh Square near the Kremlin, and some of them for the parliament building of the Russian Federation. The demands of the strikers were presented to the government of Moscow and the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, then in session. They called for social and legal protection of taximen, privatization of taxi-cab pools, and compulsory state insurance of taximen to the sum of 100,000 rubles. There was one more demand in this package: retain the domicile registration of citizens in Moscow and evict all Caucasian natives from the capital because it is precisely they who create a criminal situation in the city by robbing and murdering people.

Principles are important, but prices are rising

The struggle of taximen for their economic rights could hardly arouse sympathy among Muscovites who are often unable to take a taxi and have heard much about the large earnings of taximen. However, the demand for evicting Caucasian natives from Moscow met with understanding among ordinary people. The lingering crisis would give rise to xenophobia even in a society free of troubles. What can be said then about our society with its derision of Chukchis, record of pogroms and racist division of the population into Russians and "others." The Caucasian natives have bought up everything in Moscow and established their order in the city. This is a widespread notion among Muscovites.

The protest action of taximen under an openly chauvinist slogan demonstrated once again that the most zealous champions of one or another idea are those who have the least to do with it. The point is that taximen gain a large part of their side-line earnings thanks to Caucasian natives. The taximen evidently understood the vulnerability of their case. All of a sudden rumours spread in Moscow that during a week the number of drivers murdered by Caucasian natives had reached a dozen. Vigilant pensioners and compassionate women began to phone police stations. They were indignant that the police took no measures against violent crime, that more taximen had been murdered while the authorities did nothing to avert crime. Asked where they learned about the murders, the Muscovites who phoned police ma-





Photo by Vladimir Panov and Vladimir Svartsevich

tions readily admitted they heard the story from taximen.

On the whole, Muscovites do not like taximen because the latter rarely stop to take an old woman or a mother with a child. But gradually they became an object of compassion, especially after taximen had declared that from now on they would not take Caucasians, that is, they would be prepared to incur losses for the sake of the principle. Moreover, taximen threatened to puncture the tires of those who would give a Caucasian a lift. The fare for carrying residents of Yerevan, Tbilisi or Baku from an airport to the central part of Moscow has jumped to 800 rubles during the day and 1,000 rubles at night...

New Times has already written about how Soviet Germans emigrating from the USSR get from the Domodedovo airport (domestic service) to the international Sheremetievo–2 airport. The mafiosi from among taximen recognize Germans at first glance. Few drivers agree to take families with children and many pieces of luggage. For this purpose there are special drivers who charge from 1,500 to 5,000 rubles for several dozen kilometres. Caucasians arriving in Moscow are now treated in almost the same way.

The mayor's office and the Moscow government lent an attentive ear to the economic and social demands of the taximen. But they also gave a no less sharp reply to them: taximen made a row, incited national enmity, behaved in a criminal way, and demanded security, though they are themselves connected with the criminal world and now suffer from it.

It is quite possible, however, that the taximen who demonstrated in the streets of Moscow are not connected with the criminal world. In taxi slang they are "hat-carriers."

War on "strangers"

The real picture of criminal gangs existing in Moscow shows that taximen had no reason for venting their anger on Caucasians. "Moscow has about 30 rather powerful criminal gangs numbering each from several dozen to several hundred members, and there are more robber bands," says an official of the Moscow KGB's department for combating organized crime. "They control definite territories in the capital and have long divided the spheres of influence. There is no national division in these gangs and bands. In general, the criminal world does not know such notions as nationality, republican or state sovereignty. For instance, the Chechen group was mentioned some time ago. This does not mean, however, that it consists of Chechens only. The ringleader is a Chechen indeed. But there are Ukrainians, Russians and Balts among the members of the gang. The same can also be said about the Daghestan group. I could mention the Kuntsevo, Solntsevo, Izmailovo, Lyubertsy, Dolgoprudnoye, Mytishchi and Rostov gangs (according to the names of districts and cities). Take the Kuntsevo group, for instance. The name does not at all mean that it operates only in the Kuntsevo district of Moscow. The group

"Bombarders" and "hat-carriers"

Taximen from three groups meet passengers at the Moscow airports. Drivers forming the first group try to catch those who arrive almost at the ramp. In the hope of finding moneyed or foolish passengers, they can charge up to 500 rubles for a ride to the central part of Moscow. Drivers from the second group actively offer their services at the entrance to the airport building. They charge 250 to 300 rubles. If passengers, the main client of taximen, do not fall for the bait, so to speak, they go to the nearest taxi stand and can take a ride to the capital for 100 rubles.

Members of the first group are called "bombarders," because they bombard prospective clients with offers. Properly speaking, they are simply mafiosi who, it can be said, are "registered" at the airport. Those taximen who make their living by riding about the city are called "hat-carriers," or those who work at the pavement. "Bombarders" occupy a higher position in the taxi hierarchy and earn more. The smartest of them do not go anywhere in general. It is enough to find a client who agrees to pay 300 rubles for a ride and offer him to a "hat-carrier" for 150 rubles. The other 150 rubles go into the pocket of the "bombarder."

At almost every railway terminal, hotel or restaurant there is a tight bunch of "bombarders." It is not easy to join their company. As in other cases, the recommendation of local authoritative members is necessary. A taximan can try to "get registered" at a given airport by ingratiating himself with "bombarders." True, it is a risky affair because old-timers can puncture the tyres of his cab first and beat him later.

"Bombarders" can be found in every taxi pool. Usually they do not conceal their source of income from their less lucky colleagues. Incidentally, the monthly earning of a "hat-carrier" is not small either. He can make about 2,000 rubles. True, almost half the earnings go to repairs, the purchase of spare parts and other needs.

During a shift, a "hat-carrier" usually makes two rides to the airport and back. The first trip allows him to fulfill his daily plan of 150 rubles, while the second ride brings him the same amount for his own needs. A taximan cannot afford to ride all the time, because if his car breaks down, he will have to spend a large sum on repairs.

can have under its control prostitutes at the Izmailovo hotel complex or a taxi pool in any other district of the capital. So the area of operation can be very large."

The Moscow KGB official added that the situation had lately been complicated indeed. Apart from traditional gangs of thugs operating in the city the criminal police has recorded bands from other areas. They are drawn to Moscow by relatively more favourable conditions for their activity in the capital, compared with, say, zones of ethnic conflict.

Among them are thugs operating independently. They fly into Moscow, carry out a gangster raid and return to their sovereign state. But usually chance-comers perpetrate their crimes with the help of local Moscow bands. For instance, a serious crime was recently uncovered in the Timiryazev district of Moscow. The "object" had been examined by a Muscovite, who also masterminded the crime while protection was ensured by two newcomers. According to KGB information, the proportion of crimes committed by Caucasian natives does not exceed that of crimes committed by thugs of any other nationality.

Nevertheless, the taximen began to fight against Caucasians natives. On October 28 and 29 the Danilovsky market and the markets near the underground stations Kashirskaya, Vykhino and Ryazansky Prospekt were sacked. However, no more raids followed.

A KGB official who did not want to reveal his name offered a *New Times* reporter the following explanation of why taximen rose against Caucasians natives. According to him, the local Moscow criminal gangs are discontented with the appearance of too many "alien" groups in the capital, including bands from the Caucasus. Taximen have very close links with "local" gangs. From mid-1990 to mid-1991 the criminal police uncovered about 20 Moscow gangs. Taximen "worked" in all of them. In several cases taxi drivers were formally on the staff of their pools while in fact they did not service their routes and acted jointly with one or another band...

So a decision was made to incite taximen to the struggle against "strangers," especially because the former can act as a united and organized force.

If this explanation is correct, several more actions against taximen may follow in order to inflame their bellicose spirit.

And if a plumber is murdered?

The murder committed on October 23 is not the first one of its kind. Nikolai Latushkin, chairman of the strike committee in the 20th taxi pool of Moscow, says that the pogrom inclinations showed among taximen a year ago when their colleague was murdered. According to him, the taximan, A.Kapralov, was killed because of a dispute over vodka. Someone sold vodka at the gates of the taxi pool. The local mafia did not like it and hired Chechens to clear up the matter. On arriving at the spot the Chechens saw that no one sold vodka any longer. But they had to work the money off and decided to kick up a row in the taxi pool. A taximan was killed in the scuffle as a result.

An Interior Ministry official gave a different account of the story. Five "Chechens" (members of the Chechen group) came to the 20th taxi pool and wanted to buy vodka. Taximen took the money and went away. Three members of the Chechen group went away, too, but two remained. One of them was mercilessly beaten, and they were kicked out. The "Chechens" returned with their mates.

A SOCIOLOGIST'S VIEW

A new type of rationality?

Our socialist way of life is now more like a life of adventures. Unidentified Caucasian natives murder taximen, the latter smash up the shops of people who look Caucasian. On returning from work people can find dead bodies in their flats. Every day 200 men and women disappear on the territory of what was recently called the Soviet Union. Arms and individual protection devices are sold on markets. Rallies and demonstrations have become commonplace. The whole tenor of life has broken up.

Each of the numerous groups into which the Soviet people, the "new historic community," has divided, seeks to use forms of violence previously monopolized by the state. Before *perestroika*, the state robbed, beat and killed people legally. Today many claim the right to commit the same in accordance with the standards and rules of behaviour of the groups against which the state fought without success.

Before *perestroika*, people could complain to the Party's central committee about the actions of oppressors and killers, and these complaints sometimes brought the mechanism of retribution to life. Today, there is no one to whom people can complain. The protection of life, honour and dignity becomes the private concern of each individual. Citizens are defenceless because they remain law-abiding. Those who do not abide by the law are well armed and protected and clearly understand that it is they who exercise power. The relations existing in prison camps, deformed further by non-statutory relations in the army, have become the main principle of relations between citizens of the socialist state. Many people, from the Yeltsin administration officials to those who rule the roost at the markets, are now trying to establish who is more important.

In our time, when the bodies of repressive power have broken up, while other bodies of power do not actually exist, the rationality of the socialist regime is giving way to another, nebulous type of rationality. People react in such a situation in a simple way, just as they do during periods of crisis and civil wars. Once again the time has come in our country when animal instincts take over the normal human behaviour. Searching for food and personal security (and soon to keep them warm), people will form a mob which will behave in the only way possible: they will rob, kill and beat those against whom they will be pitted by new prophets and preachers.

Simon Kordonsky

Photo by Yuri Gripas

It happens that five to six murders are registered in Moscow during a day. If, God forbid, a plumber is killed, Muscovites may be left without hot water in winter.

The same question was asked during a strike of taximen in Tbilisi last year. Taxi drivers, mostly Russians, gathered in front of the Government House and blocked Rustaveli Avenue after the murder of their three colleagues. They accused the police of inactivity and put forward economic demands. Top officials of the republican interior ministry and Zviad Gamsakhurdia, then leader of the opposition Round Table political bloc, met with taximen and were able to calm them down.

Taximen in constant danger

The reasons for attacks on taximen are well known to the police, common people and taximen themselves. Taxi drivers say that anyone of them can also be killed because of money. Here is a story of a taximan:

"Some 14 years ago, enticed by the idea of making easy money through easy work (ride for pleasure in your cab and put money into your pocket), I decided to become a taximan. The first shock came four months after I was taken on: my teacher was killed by brass-knuckles. The murderers took away his wallet, in which there were only 50 rubles, took off his boots and jacket, and left him lying on the ground near the Zarya, Altai and Vostok hotels. Later, I repeatedly fought with passengers, and on two occasions I brought them to a police station. Many times passengers ran away without paying the fare. Once it was done by Uzbeks and another time by Georgians. In both cases the taximeter showed a large sum. Georgians call it riding for "chichiko," that is, for "thank you."

Taximen are attacked because robbers know they have a lot of money. The matter has been settled in the United States, where a taxi-cab driver hands his earnings to the cashier every hour. In our country, this procedure is acceptable only if taximen charge strictly according to the meter. Even if he hands his legal earnings to the cashier, he will have a bigger sum left in his pocket.

Drawing by Victor Bogorad

Taximen are also attacked with the aim of hijacking the car. Statistics show, however, that private car owners are attacked more often.

Speaking on television and then before taximen, the Moscow KGB chief hinted that the nationalist sentiments among taxi drivers are the result of ideological brainwashing. It is possible that the Pamyat (Memory) organization has played its part here. Indeed, after a meeting between taximen and Moscow authorities fighters against "aliens" appeared in the Automobilist club.

It is even hinted that underground Communists who supported the August coup may pull the strings here. They, allegedly, find it advantageous for them to provoke disorder in Moscow and play off one republic against another. The point is that the clamp down on Caucasian natives in the capital may have a snowballing effect. According to the information of the Moscow KGB chief, Azerbaijan's "shadow structures" decided to evict from their republic 100 Russians for one Azerbaijanian removed from Moscow.

Moscow for Muscovites and taximen

The actions of taximen expressed Russian chauvinism which is likely to explode given the conditions of the crisis.

A clash between taximen and Azerbaijanians was reported in Tula last May. Some 30 people took part in the scuffle.

On June 28, a fight broke out in Kashin, Tver region, between local residents, Chechens and Daghestanis near a wine shop. It continued the next day, involving 200 people. For two more days the people of Kashin held demonstrations, demanding the eviction of all Caucasian natives from the town. The authorities met this demand in order to calm the population, and Kashin is now almost completely ethnically homogeneous.

There is talk in Moscow that Caucasian natives will retaliate. The sentiments were stirred up by one of the Moscow top officials, who said at the meeting with taximen: "Caucasians are meeting right now to decide what retaliatory measures to take."

New Times found out that the meeting was held by Azerbaijanians, who asked Moscow's internal affairs department to ensure protection from aggressive taximen and prevent their attacks in markets. True, the Azerbaijanians also presented an ultimatum: if violent actions on the part of taximen do not stop, Azerbaijanians have enough forces, arms and transport to retaliate "in a worthy manner." Incidentally, the meeting was attended by only 50 or 60 Azerbaijanians. As for other Caucasian communities in Moscow, their attitude is quite definite: not to react to provocations and to appear in the markets and in hotels as rarely as possible.

A lull has set in. It is very fragile, however, and the situation can explode any time. The taximen are going to stage another strike on November 13. How will it develop? For some reason it was believed in the past that Moscow is guaranteed against ethnic conflicts.

Irina Lagunina and Oleg Vishnyakov

Someone has evicted them all

According to the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, the compulsory (forced) migration of the population as a result of ethnic conflicts on the territory of the former USSR amounted to 700,000 people for October 1, 1991. This number includes 300,000 Armenians, 200,000 Azerbaijanians, about 100,000 Meskhetian Turks, almost 40,000 Russians, large groups of Uzbeks from Kirghizia and Georgian and Ossetian refugees from South Ossetia.

The settlement of refugees proceeded in this way: 194,000 Azerbaijanis went from Armenia to Azerbaijan, 6,000 to Russia; 237,000 Armenians moved to Armenia, 12,000 to Nagorny Karabakh, 41,000 to Russia; most of the Meskhetian Turks settled in Azerbaijan (44,000) and in Russia (48,000).

A total of 175,000 refugees arrived in Russia as a result of forced migration in the course of ethnic conflicts.

Villagers predominate among the refugees, though many people came from Sumgait, Baku, Novy Uzen, Kyzyl and Tskhinvali. As of September 1, 1991, about 1,500 people were killed and more than 16,000 wounded in ethnic conflicts.

The country is declining and the trend shows no signs of abating. We have suffered the most in the course of social vivisection, and we will have to pay dearly to recover

Hoping for a Western mouse

Leonid Vasilyev

Why was the August putsch a flop? Alexander Yanov, a US scientist with whom I studied history at Moscow University, elaborated a so-called "Weimar" model of historical development. Departing from German general Kapp's failure seventy years ago, Yanov predicted that the August putsch in the USSR would collapse in several days. Since the prediction was made on August 19, the professor's hypothetical model gained scientific validity after the putschists were arrested.

Kapp's putsch was started in March 1920 by an ex-general of a has-been empire. It was an insurrection of the forces of order

against the democratic government in the conditions of total economic collapse. The insurgents hoped that people who were sick and tired of hungry life would rise to restore order and the monarchy. But the people refused to return to the past. It was later, in 1933, that a novel totalitarian idea effected what Kapp and Emperor Wilhelm's generals had failed to attain.

Yanov believes those events are parallel, to the minutest detail, to the August developments in our country. The situation is the same: the country is heading for democracy. Old slogans harking back to the past do not work in such conditions. But, alas, people may appeal to new slogans which are utterly different from the old ones and which have nothing to do with democracy.

Most crucial in such a situation is the assistance of the world community, especially the capitalist democratic West, to those structures which are not yet familiar with developed capitalism and democracy, and which experience naltural difficulties on their way from the command-administrative relations to those of the market economy and private property. In his inferences Yanov resorts to a Russian fairy-tale (about a family pulling a fabulously huge turnip without any success until a house mouse joins them) to demonstrate the part the West may play, exerting a minor but crucial effort that will finally ensure success.

Russia has always been between the East and the West. And though the Eastern element prevailed in it, beginning with Peter the Great Russia began to slowly but steadily drift towards the bourgeois democratic standards of the West. Prussia is a country no less Western with relevant standards, including those of bourgeois democracy (this relates to Spain, too, and some other European countries in which totalitarianism was in full swing in the 20th century). But it is exactly Russia and Prussia that gave birth early in the century to totalitarianism — communist and national-socialist. Why was it so? Let us single out the principal features: neither Russia nor Prussia (the German Empire after Bismarck) was a developed bourgeois democratic state. On the contrary, both countries were dominated by the spirit of monarchism and paternalism of social discipline, in both of them the author-

ity of state machinery reduced the individual to almost nothing, and this affinity of the two countries brings them closer to the countries of classical Eastern despotism.

Totalitarianism of the 20th century is none but a relapse to the classical Eastern command-administrative structure in various modifications.

It cannot be doubted that Eastern structures are not capable of reforming themselves. This also refers to Japan which, at first glance, may seem to testify to the opposite. They are not capable of reforming themselves because traditional society of the command-administrative structure precludes any other structure from appearing, despite the sacred proclamations of the Marxist theory to the contrary. It is evident in this case that any transformation can be effected only by an impetus from outside, from an essentially different structure like that of the market economy and private property. This means that a stable Eastern structure commands a tremendous inner potential which hinders transformation – Alexander Yanov called it counterreformatory forces. It is these counterreformatory forces that resist any outside influence, and not without success.

The second thesis that leaves no doubt is that any transformation can succeed only if the foreign "mouse" adds its decisive impetus in the right place at the right time when the minor effort is enough to tip the scale.

Will this impetus, that is the West's assistance, surely lead to success? Not at all. The counterreformatory forces can come to the fore again – but this time under a new guise.

Our tired society crippled by the Marxist experiment is impoverished to the utmost. The fight against private property deprived people not only of property but also of essential personal belongings. Having no property, personal belongings or housing of his own, man becomes degraded – hence drunkenness, crime, loose morals, etc.

A revolution is always a crisis. It takes time before a new standard manifests its advantages, at least to such an extent that they are noticed by the majority. Immediately people begin craving for the old standard which, more or less, provided for their subsistence however poor it might have been.

Add to this the collapse of the economy, unemployment, refugees, and you have ready material for a counterrevolutionary putsch. Putsches would follow one another if anybody could offer a realistic alternative everybody could understand. But does that mean the situation will not change in the future? A new idea may gain currency that will look as appealing as communism or national socialism and the counterreform (counterrevolution) may get the upper hand. This will happen if, say, a national or a national-religious idea comes to the fore.

If one wants historical examples, suffice it to mention Iranian fundamentalism. True, it was brought about by extreme circumstances, and although such circumstances may naturally arise again, the majority of the countries of the East and the developing world have embarked on a different path of development.

The majority of the developing countries have set forth a national idea which motivates people to make every effort to attain progress using foreign assistance. Practically it means that the national, and even national-religious, idea in its moderate form is not always the basis for counterreform.

The national or national-religious idea may become a slogan of counterrevolution these days only in extreme circumstances. But is there a guarantee that we will not find ourselves exactly in such a situation?

None whatsoever. In fact, we are rather close to it. Democratic traditions are still embryonic in this country and the communist experiment lasted too long even for the elder generation to remember a better life, let alone retain historical traditions. So far we can only dream of a stable middle class which composes the basis of democratic structures.

What we can do now is rely on the West's assistance in implementing certain measures which would help neutralize any attempt to stage a putsch.

This line of action seems wise and practicable and the West is ready to render assistance of any kind – from material aid to moral and organizational support. One should not neglect this. The point is whether we are ready to use it, or rather capable of using it to our own avail to cope with all our problems which nobody will do for us.

Life is full of evidence that in many respects Western aid comes to the unprepared ground and often dissipates without a trace like water through sand. Our country is unique. Nowhere in the world has the idea of property ever been debased so much as in our country and never have men of property been hated so much. Suffice it to recall China, the biggest country of Marxist socialism with the strongest Eastern despotic tradition of the state's authority over the individual, to see the gap that divides us from the Chinese who know quite well what property is and how hard they should work to multiply it using market mechanisms – and all that under the Marxists' rule.

It seems that after many years of hopeless discussion and experimentation the country enters upon a period of active privatization, primarily that of housing, minor retail trade and service facilities, medium and large enterprises, and lastly land. Sooner or later this will bring the desired effect. The process may be accelerated by wise policies of the authorities and prompt support from the West. A serious question which as yet has no answer is whether the process of privatization will bring tangible results before the counterrevolutionary forces build up power and produce an idea that may appeal to the dispossessed masses.

The components of such an idea have already surfaced – suffice it to mention anti-semitism, patriots from Pamyat, some ill-fated candidates for the presidency in Russia who collected, nevertheless, millions of votes. The forces of black reaction are brewing an alliance catered for by ideologists appealing to the latter-day Russia victimized by the Bolsheviks.

Today no one hinders reform in any way – the matter is only in the optimum course and pace. There is hardly an alternative that might satisfy everyone. The standard of living is dropping and is likely to continue. This is the price to be paid for the Marxist experiment. True, the costs are paid not by those who plunged the country into that experiment or by those who for decades have dragged it out fearing to admit that the country has long been falling down the precipice. We have suffered from the experiment more than anyone. And it is harder for us to get out of it. And we will have to pay the most for it. No "novel" idea is likely to help us, except the time-tested transformation towards the bourgeois standard. The country will not be saved by another putsch of any sort, nor will it be saved by claims to Russia's uniqueness and return to the past. We shall not be frightened by shock therapy Polish style. We wish we lived like Poles do today, with God's blessing.

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

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DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS

Finale is important, not START



Moscow's consent to devise a non-nuclear anti-missile system jointly with Washington is a mistake. The two countries have more promising areas of cooperation

Alexei Arbatov and Thomas Cochran

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was signed last July after many years of negotiations. The targets set in the Treaty can hardly inspire even optimists, however.

The slashing of the strategic arsenals of each of the two powers by the year 2000 from more than 10,000 nuclear warheads to 6,000 does not accord much with the widely declared aim of partnership. It can be repeated hundreds of times that Moscow and Washington no longer regard each other as enemies. The bipolar military confrontation will remain a fact, however, if the two powers continue to keep thousands of nuclear warheads aimed at each other.

Semi-partners, semi-enemies

Since the nuclear missile potentials of the Soviet Union and the United States remain at high levels their missiles are aimed at each other simply because there are not so many targets in the rest of the world. The two countries do not have political or strategic reasons to attack each other, and are not expected to have such in the near future.

The White House and the Kremlin obviously see this contradiction, as is evident from President Bush's initiative and Mikhail Gorbachev's reply in September and October which proposes a faster arms

Alexei Arbatov is Director of the Centre for Disarmament and Strategic Stability at the Foreign Policy Association of the USSR.

Thomas Cochran is a senior researcher at the Natural Resources Defence Council of the United States.

Superfluous weight

By 1995 the United States could remove two of the three warheads from 400 out of the 500 Minuteman-3 missiles installed in silos and reduce from eight to four the number of warheads on each of the 480 Trident-1 missiles, including those that will go to submarines instead of Trident-2 missiles. It would then have 1,760 warheads on 440 Trident-1 missiles, the five remaining submarines of the Poseidon (Lafayette) class, and 15 new Ohio-class submarines.

The Soviet Union could "unload" 150 silo-based SS-19 missiles to be left after cuts under START. Today it has 300 missiles of this class, with 130 of them in the Ukraine and the rest in Russia, where this system is assembled. The measure would provide for reducing the number of warheads on each missile from six to four. The number of monoblock ground-mobile SS-25 missiles, which are assembled in Russia and deployed in Russia and Byelorussia, is likely to increase from 300 to 400, and 200 more missiles of the same class could be placed in silos.

Together with the removal of obsolete systems from the sea-based forces it would be necessary to "unload" 120 missiles on six already built submarines of the Typhoon class (from ten to four warheads on each missile). The sea-based forces would also retain 80 triple-warhead missiles on five older, Delta-3 submarines (our name Kalmar) and 160 such missiles on ten new, Delta-IV submarines (or Delfin submarines, of which we have seven now) by reducing the number of warheads on them from four to two.

reduction compared with that envisaged by START. It is a half-measure, however.

Washington proposed large-scale measures. One of them is elimination of all ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with independently targeted warheads which constitute up to 60 percent and about 20 percent of the total in the Soviet Union and the United States respectively. Simultaneously, Washington announced measures for dismantling and placing in depots nuclear arms from heavy bombers, lowering the degree of their take-off readiness, and removing old missiles to be scrapped from combat alertness (four percent reduction in the total amount of warheads).

Instead of going further, Moscow made only a timid half-step by proposing to cut the strategic arsenals of the two countries to 5,000 (not 6,000) nuclear warheads, remove nuclear weapons from bombers, and withdraw slightly more obsolete missiles, to be scrapped under the Treaty, from the state of combat alertness within a shorter time.

An expensive undertaking

In the next ten years it will not be easy to decide on taking deep cuts in the ground- and sea-based ballistic missiles. First of all, the processes of dismantling, elimination and conversion involved in the reduction of weapons are economically expensive and technically complex. Even cuts under START, modest by present standards, will require considerable expenditure.

Secondly, a sharp reduction in the number of warheads will call for a more drastic reduction in the number of carriers, for a large part of missiles have multiple warheads. As a result, the Soviet Union and the United States would retain a small amount of ground-based missile launchers and a considerably shrunken fleet. Mutual vulnerability would increase, thereby undermining strategic stability. The situation could be corrected by way of deploying missiles with monoblock heads instead of multiple warhead missiles with a large part of forces consisting of mobile launchers. It is a very expensive undertaking, however, and it will take much time to implement these measures. The Soviet Union, with its economy in a deplorable state, has little, if any, possibility of putting this idea into effect.

Lastly, a more drastic reduction would call for new talks and, since we are living in the nineties, it would overlap the time limits of START. The finished treaty would be put off again for the sake of a more attractive but unfeasible objective.

The hidden race

There is a way out nevertheless. During the nineties the strategic nuclear forces of the two powers could be reduced not to 6,000 or 5,000 but to 10 percent, to 1,000 warheads for each party, without undermining stability and national security and without additional excessive expenditure, without discarding START, which was worked out with great difficulty.

Signing START in the summer of this year, the two parties intended first of all to cut obsolete armaments while continuing to deploy new expensive systems (multiple-warhead missiles, heavy bombers, mobile land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, both with monoblock and individually targetable heads). As a result, by the year 2000 the two powers would have cut their forces by 30 percent. However, they would have completely modernized them by enhancing their striking power. Moreover, they would have to spend money on the modernization of missiles, the elimination of old ones, and measures of control.

START does not at all envisage the reduction of nuclear weapons in this way. Another approach could be based on two principles. First, it is a qualitative exchange as regards destabilizing systems and, second, a broader use of the method of "unloading" ballistic missiles, that is, removal some of the warheads from the multiple warhead instead of eliminating missile carriers and their launchers.

Nuclear stumbling block

Mutual elimination of destabilizing systems. Moscow should at last agree to a reduction of heavy silo-based SS-18 missiles not by half, as specified in START (to 154 units), but to zero. These missiles, each carrying ten warheads of a megaton class, are a cold-war legacy. They are regarded in the West as silokillers, first strike weapons, particularly because they are not fit for a retaliatory blow since they will not "survive" in their silos. At present 104 SS-18 missiles are deployed in Kazakhstan and the rest 204 on the territory of the Russian Federation. They are produced at the Dnepropetrovsk missile plant in the Ukraine.

Strategic armaments of this type are like a stumbling block in the way of radical disarmament. They impel the United States to develop countersystems: 50 silo-based Peacekeeper missiles, each carrying ten warheads, and 96 Trident-2 ballistic missiles based on submarines. Trident-2 missiles, each carrying eight warheads, are deployed on four new submarines of the Ohio class. Thanks to their high accuracy they are intended to hit Soviet silos.

Soviet SS-24 missiles are similar to the Peacekeeper system. Ten of these missiles (the weapons are produced in Pavlograd) are based in silos in the Russian Federation and 46 in the Ukraine. They would have to be dismantled, too, especially since they are a tempting and vulnerable targets and are fit for the first strike only.

Thus, Moscow would dismantle two systems – 364 missiles (3,640 warheads) and Washington would do the same – 146 missiles (1,268 warheads). Moreover, it would give up plans of deploying 336 more Trident-2 missiles (2,688 warheads) on the other 14 submarines of this class.

The method of complete "unloading" (to zero) could help to withdraw much more quickly and cheaply all the obsolete ground- and sea-based missiles which were to be destroyed under the Treaty. Otherwise, the statements on their removal from the state of alertness cannot be verified. If the parties concerned detach all the warheads from these missiles and put them in storage, agree on additional procedures of control



Drawing from Dagens Nyheter (Sweden)

and thereby withdraw them from the nuclear balance, the dismantling of these missiles, silos and submarines could be effected over a longer period. This could be done with less expenditure, and the ways of using the systems for peace purposes could be thought out thoroughly.

The remaining advanced systems should be partially "unloaded." It will be a quick and cheap reduction of the number of warheads, and their concentration and vulnerability will decrease at the same time.

Generals can sleep quietly

In 1995 the United States would have 940 ground- and sea-based missiles, 20 submarines and a total of 2,460 nuclear warheads. The Soviet Union would retain 1,146 missiles, 21 submarines and a total of 2,400 warheads in its strategic offensive arsenal.

In other words, by 1995 (instead of 2000) the two countries would have lessened their arsenals of warheads not by 30 or 50 percent, as Gorbachev proposed in October, but by 75 percent. Without breaking the asymetry usual for the Soviet General Staff, the United States would have roughly 70 percent of its warheads on the sea and the Soviet Union – about 60 percent of its warheads on land. The Americans will traditionally retain slightly more warheads and the Soviet Union – a few more carriers.

All this can be achieved with less expenditure while strengthening stability and preserving the START structures. Besides, by combining unilateral and reciprocal measures the two parties could maintain the military strategic parity so dear to the hearts of brass hats. True, the vast programmes of modernization will have to be curtailed sharply, but in any case this will be required by the economic situation. Let the military-industrial complexes of the two powers put up with the present situation. The era of militarist bonanza is over.

It is necessary, of course, to weaken the restrictions on "unloading" which are specified in START for fear of uncontrolled "reverse loading." The system of control can be extended considerably. Let inspectors stay permanently at missile bases, airfields and ports. At worst, the two countries will have roughly equal opportunities for a reverse expansion (2,000 to 2,500 warheads and missiles from the stores).

The second stage, covering a period from 1995 to 2000, will call for START-2. There will be time to work out such a treaty in the first half of the current decade. The new treaty could be based on the principle of a further "unloading" of missiles, up to the complete removal of warheads from some portion of missiles. The missiles will remain in their positions while the warheads will be kept in stores under the permanent control of the other party.

When missiles "grow thin"

As a result, the United States will retain 100 silo-based monoblock ICBMs of the type of "unloaded" Minuteman-3 or new, Midgetman missiles and 400 missiles in silos, but without warheads. Its naval force would consist of 18 Ohio-class submarines equipped with Trident-Is (or a missile of a new type), each with two warheads.

The Soviet Union would have 400 ground-mobile SS-25 missiles, plus 250 silo-based SS-19 and SS-25 missiles "unloaded" to zero. The missiles on Typhoon submarines would have not four but three warheads each, while the missiles on 13 Delta-IV (Delfin) submarines could be "unloaded" from three to one warhead.

In all, the United States will have 18 submarines and 932 missiles in active service (including missiles with removed warheads), and 964 nuclear warheads in firing trim, whereas the Soviet Union will have 19 submarines, 978 missiles and 968 warheads. In other words, the strategic arsenals will be cut by 90 percent (in the number of warheads) while the number of carriers and warheads will be roughly one to one, that is, close to the ideal of stability. The opportunities for a "reverse" will be equal, too.

The reduction of the number of warheads below the 1,000 level is not only of symbolic but also of political-strategic importance. The nuclear weapons of the two countries will become comparable in their amount (while keeping a substantial "unloaded" reserve) with the forces of other nuclear powers. The bipolar nuclear confrontation will cease, and Moscow and Washington will be able to candidly say that they are no longer enemies or opponents in the strategic respect. The other nuclear countries could be drawn into the process of multilateral cuts.

And the last thing. Such measures are possible if strict restrictions are preserved on the deployment of strategic anti-missile defence, including ground- and space-based interception systems. For this reason Moscow's consent in October to devise a non-nuclear anti-missile system seems to be a wrong decision (as if no one knew before that the Strategic Defence Initiative is a non-nuclear programme). The two powers have far more promising areas of cooperation, including cooperation in achieving the aims by which the "joint" anti-missile defence system is justified.

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Solidarity suffers a setback

While the former Communists score a victory

The returns of the recent parliamentary elections sent Poland's ruling circles into a state of mild shock. The defeat of the former national leaders was devastating and even more formidable than in Spain, Portugal, Greece, or in similar circumstances in Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and Bulgaria, when they were shedding their authoritarian regimes. The Polish development is interesting for its analogies with possible trends in the USSR.

We wrote earlier, on the eve of the elections in Poland, that the outcome could be a chaotic stalemate, and predicted the emergence of a **parliament without an evident leader** and without a constructive opposition. A weighty say in the opposition was expected to belong to Social Democrats. The prediction proved to be correct for the most part.

The electorate turnout slightly exceeded 40 percent. Two antagonists emerged in the lead, scoring equal numbers of votes: 13 percent each. They are: Democratic Alliance led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik and Bronislaw Gieremek (i.e., people who formed Solidarity's first government and put through Leszek Balcerowicz's plan of "shock treatment") and Lewica (the leftists) uniting Social Democrats and the All-Poland Trade Unions Alliance (which poses as Solidarity's rival force).

The centre-right, representing political forces directly associated with the incumbent president and his government, were thus dealt a heavy blow: the Agreement of Centrist Forces and the Liberal Democratic Congress party got nine and slightly over seven percent of the votes respectively. While the extreme right – the Confederation for an Independent Poland and especially the Electoral Catholic Action – scored a success by jointly winning over 18 percent of votes. Solidarity and several groups which had split from it got only between two and five percent of the votes.

The political patchwork pattern which formed as a result of the elections is unique and invites concern. In my opinion, this is a sign that people are fed up with all that politicking and with the leaders' ambitions. The society has lost its bearing in the sea of political parties, movements and factions. Many people blame the nation's low living standards on men at the helm of the state. Quite a few people feel nostalgic about the former universally poor but guaranteed existence. Hence the slack electorate turnout, factual defeat for the ruling coalition, and the sudden rise of the post-communist parties. Among the factors securing their success are the collectivism and party discipline instilled in their electorate by decades of communist rule and the bitter awareness of moral injuries suffered by them after the June 1989 electoral defeat. Jacek Kuron explains the triumph of the leftists' alliance as a reaction to the policy of "decommunization" in the form of massive hysteria aimed against the former members of the Polish United Workers' Party.

The lingering past
Cartoon by Stefan Popa (Romania)

The decline in Solidarity's popularity is explained by this trade unions' refusal to resist the government's unpopular actions. Power structures spawned by Solidarity made the latter their hostage in the moral sense. Thus, Solidarity ceased to be a trade union for defending the workers' interests.

The relative success of the Democratic Alliance reveals that a certain part of the nation, particularly the intellectuals, favour the more tolerant and moderate course offered by Tadeusz Mazowiecki and his friends, who display a sober approach to economic and social issues, as well as – importantly – to their political rivals.

The high rating of a right-wing Catholic movement, known as the Electoral Catholic Action, is perhaps the result of the officially sanctioned propaganda from church pulpits rather than the workings of the Polish traditional mentality. Priests were directly urging their parishes to support specific candidates and even distributed leaflets supporting them.

Anyway, the outcome of the elections gave a complicated mission to the powers that be, primarily to President Lech Walesa, who responded.

He acknowledged that the nation was disillusioned and disunited, and suggested **four alternatives for the future government:**

– a government headed by the Democratic Union and supported by Solidarity;

– a government headed by Walesa and supported by parties grouping around Solidarity;

– a coalition government led by Walesa and representing the seven top-scoring parties;

– a non-partisan government of experts led by Walesa.

The last three variants envisage the term of office of two years.

However, none of these options can guarantee political stability in the given situation. It is going to be difficult to form an efficient coalition because it isn't likely to secure more than a third of the votes in the parliament. Aggravating the problem, Leszek Miller, one of the leaders of the left-wing coalition and a former Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee, has announced that the Social Democrats "don't visualize themselves as part of the government and therefore remain in opposition to it." The official Solidarity, scoring five percent of the votes, although once it was supported by 10 million Poles, also prefers to stay away from the government because of its current meagre electoral support.

President Walesa will possibly have to take up the whole of the executive power in the country, and the political analysts are busy paving the way for this by means of citing the example of Boris Yeltsin in Russia who undertakes to lead the Cabinet. But this option would involve a lot of risk.

There is still another alternative: to dissolve the parliament and hold new elections. But who can guarantee a more positive outcome?

Rudolf Borecki,
our own correspondent
WARSAW

Another Napoleon won't be accepted by India

The country of many wonders won't accept a military coup

India has experienced more than one political crisis. As a matter of fact, it is living through one at present. The country has had four prime ministers within the last two years. The current government headed by P.V.Narasimha Rao (elected leader of the Indian National Congress following the tragic death of Rajiv Gandhi last May) is afloat mainly thanks to skillful maneuvering between the underwater rocks of factional strife. However, no one can guarantee that the incumbent chief executives will remain in office longer than their predecessors.

India is also afflicted by an economic crisis, one of the gravest in its history as an independency, believe both the independent experts and the government. The nation's hard-currency resources have been dramatically depleted to a level guaranteeing merely three-week imports. Inflation indicators have soared to the 15-percent mark. Prices are on the rise, in defiance of the price reduction promised to be achieved within the first hundred days in office of the Rao government.

Militant separatist and nationalist movements are tearing India apart with bloodshed and violence in the north (Jammu and Kashmir), the south-east (Assam), and the west (Punjab). Civilian authorities are unable to maintain law and order there through democratic means alone. Armed force is used to control Punjab and Kashmir areas bordering on Pakistan and to block the weapons and ammunition supply routes of Sikh and Kashmir separatists from that country. For the second time this year, the Army was sent to Assam to neutralize the subversive activity of the organization calling itself the Assam National Liberation Front. The Army is also used to quench outbursts of communal and religious strife in India.

Does this indicate that democracy has used up all its resources in that country? And that the time for "iron rule" has come? As a matter of fact, no one in India is happy about the use of the armed forces in internal political fights. The military also believe that the use of the Army for this purpose is denigrating and a blemish on the Army's honour. However, there's no fear that the Army will transgress the boundaries of the authority delegated to them by the Constitution and get directly involved in politics. Democratic pillars which have supported India's statehood for over four decades now bar the Army's access to power and involvement in politics. However, the world's greatest democracy, India hasn't, regretfully, evolved into a form envisaged by its founder, Jawaharlal Nehru, who defined the democratic principles as equal electoral rights, as well as economic and social ones. Indeed, electoral rights are equally extended to all Indians. Even the most dramatic developments in the history of India as an independency didn't disrupt the continuity of the democracy's political process in which only national elections – and never a group of putschists or some kind of tribunal – have given the nation its leaders.

A demonstration staged by fanatical Hindus in Delhi. The authorities express their concern, but no one calls for "resolute actions"

Photo from Der Spiegel (Germany)

Indeed, India's top brass are immune to the virus of Bonapartism, also thanks to the very system of the armed forces command. The peak of a military career is the post of the chief of staff of the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force. The post is given for two years at most (exceptions are very rare) and always by the close of the person's term of service. The work of the three branches' staffs is coordinated by the Defence Ministry which has no military servicemen among its top officials. Posts of the minister and his deputies are given to representatives of the political party which is currently in power in India. Other key posts in the ministry, down to those of departmental chiefs, are occupied by non-partisan civilian administrators, and this helps ensure stability of the work of the Defence Ministry in spite of frequent changes in the government.

But don't the military begrudge the civilians the alleged usurpation of their privileges? No, says General K.Sundarjee, former Army Chief of Staff: "The experience of the rule exercised by the brass hats in neighbouring Pakistan, Burma, and Bangladesh – as well as in many other countries of the world – shows that military dictatorships only multiply problems and never solve them. They only undermine the armed forces' prestige in the eye of the nation and thus weaken the armed forces, which harms the national ability for defence."

Sergei Irodov,
our own correspondent

NEW DELHI

Privatization: who gains from it?

Political scientist **Vadim BELOTSERKOVSKY** talks with **Vladlen KRIVOSHEYEV,** head of the Czecho-Slovakia sector at the Academy of Sciences' Institute for International Economic and Political Studies

Vadim Belotserkovsky – You have studied the problems of Czecho-Slovakia for many years. The processes now under way in the former socialist country will also take place in the former Soviet Union. I have in mind privatization in particular. What does the Czecho-Slovak experience show?

Vladlen Krivosheyev – As you know, there are two methods of privatization. The first is to transfer the ownership of enterprises, offices, shops, institutes and so on to their work collectives. The second is to sell enterprises to those who can afford to buy them. Czecho-Slovakia has accepted the second method.

V.B. It is easy to sell small enterprises and businesses because buyers are always available. It is, however, very difficult to find those who would buy large and medium-sized enterprises. How are they going to privatize them in Czecho-Slovakia?

V.K. They want to find the answer by organizing privatization in stages. The newspapers have published lists of more than 1,500 Czecho-Slovak enterprises which are to be privatized or closed down.

V.B. Who has drawn up these lists?

V.K. This was done by specialists who studied the state of affairs at enterprises and determined their viability.

V.B. It turns out that government specialists decide the fate of enterprises and their personnel without control on the part of legislative bodies.

V.K. It is not quite so. They pay heed to the opinion of representatives of enterprises.

V.B. The representatives of the management or the work collective?

V.K. The management. However, the work collective can influence its opinion, and I know instances of this kind.

V.B. There are no legal provisions of privatization.

V.K. Unfortunately, the law on privatization does not envisage its procedure. It merely says what part of the cost of an enterprise shall be privatized by selling its shares for coupons. These coupons will be issued to all citizens over 18 with regard for the proportion of the total cost of state property subject to privatization. The law also specifies what part of shares of one or another enterprise shall remain for some time in the hands of the state. Here is a concrete example – the integrated heavy engineering works in the Slovak town of Rajec. its personnel consists of 11,000 workers and employees. After privatization the state will retain 67 percent of the shares and 33 percent will be sold or, more exactly exchanged for privatization coupons.

V.B. Can these coupons be used for buying anything else besides the shares of enterprises?

V.K. No, citizens can buy only shares for these coupons. A special bureau is to be set up with the aim of helping citizens decide the shares of what enterprises they should buy in exchange for coupons.

V.B. Many people will probably want to buy shares of the best known enterprises, the most reliable ones, and there may not be enough such shares for all.

V.K. To the best of my knowledge, the architects of the Czecho-Slovak reform do not yet have a clear answer to this question. In their opinion privatization should be started, and experience will then show what to amend.

V.B. In any case, many citizens will have to buy shares of not very reliable enterprises. In the West shares are sold only for money, and the shares of more reliable and prospering enterprises are more expensive. The share market evens out demand and supply.

There was a time when we invested our savings in valuable toilet paper
Drawing by Peter Gossani (Czecho-Slovakia)

V.K. In the former socialist countries most people do not have money to buy shares, and if they have some extra money they will hardly take risks and spend it on shares. That is why the Czecho-Slovak reformers decided to give privatization coupons to citizens.

V.B. What will an enterprise receive by giving its shares in exchange for what is virtually scraps of paper on which nothing can be bought? In the future an enterprise will have to pay dividends to the shareholders. Is there any economic expediency here?

V.K. The Czecho-Slovak authorities say that no economic effect is now expected from such privatization. It has no economic content. The authors of the reform think it is merely a legal beginning of denationalization. It is, of course, a weak point of the programme...

V.B. I would describe the programme as demagogic and populist. Small shareholders will never be real owners of large enterprises. We have world experience to prove this statement. Besides, the dividends will be depreciated by inflation, and their payment will obviously become a second tax for enterprises.

One important thing should be noted here. Since 67 percent of the shares belong to the state, an enterprise virtually remains state property. Incidentally, I think that this way of privatization is absolutely unacceptable to Russia because it has a military-industrial complex and almost all enterprises – large and medium-sized – either directly belong to the military-industrial complex or are under its control. The system you have talked about is simply a present for the MIC. It will continue to keep all the property under its control while the work collectives in the first place will be deceived. They have in fact paid the cost of these enterprises by their labour, the huge deductions from their incomes into the treasury in addition to taxes. They have been robbed by the state and now they will be robbed by shareholders.

You have said that the Czecho-Slovak authorities do not know how to act now. It is difficult to believe that. In the last 30 years work collectives throughout the world have bought their enterprises and achieved good results. They buy them on an instalment plan, usually ranging from 10 to 15 years. During this period the authorities even ease the tax burden of such enterprises. There are about 10,000 such enterprises in America. In Spain there is even a little state of self-managed enterprises: the Mondragón federation has existed for 30 years now. Why not to use this experience in Russia?

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The comandante and others

Or why social surgery has brought politicians no rewards

"A socialist developing country..." This is a quotation from the programme of the Communist Party of Cuba. Incidentally, that was how Romania's sociopolitical system was defined under Ceausescu. Is such a hybrid at all possible? In any case, putting forward the "bold," as Soviet social scientists called it, but actually harebrained concept of transition to socialism bypassing the capitalist stage (let alone the stage of mature capitalism), Lenin linked up, nevertheless, this speculative possibility with one indispensable condition: economic, political and military aid from the state where a socialist revolution has been carried out.

Now, does a revolution which can defend itself with outside help only have a future, if not the very right to exist? Isn't "keeping it afloat" by artificial means a form of the "export of revolution"?

After all, a revolutionary transformation of society amounts to social surgery in a situation where therapy is ineffectual or passive. In other words, it is an extreme measure which is inevitably followed by rehabilitation, by a "concervative period" – a gradual abating of revolutionary fever when the maximalist slogans and aims of the revolution are brought into conformity with the real level of development of productive forces. The classical revolutions of the past and some of the 20th-century revolutions – such as that in Portugal – are cases in point.

To ignore this real level means to "skip" stages of society's normal development – an attempt doomed to failure as all, even the noblest experiments of this kind have proved beyond doubt. This includes even those, incidentally, which proceeded from the anti-Marxist premise that socialism is post-capitalism. The well-established notion of socialism as the alternative to capitalism is a dangerous delusion which has landed the East European and "third world" models of socialism in a blind alley. This is true of the Latin American models, let alone the Afro-Asian ones, Africa and Asia being far behind the Latin American countries in the level of development of capitalism. The "third way" – suggested by General Velasco Alvarado of Peru and related by some analysts, contrary of the General's own concept, to "socialist orientation" – has also proved utopian. The activity of Chile's Popular Unity government – the first democratically elected socialist government in the history of Latin America – was not altogether free of Leftist excesses and brought 16 years of violent dictatorship in its wake. The socialist experiment in Grenada came to a dramatic end. The last lamentable example is the ten-year rule of the Sandinist National Liberation Front in Nicaragua which also went by trial and error but, nevertheless, claimed to have created a special model of socialism.

Is it Cuba's turn now?.. The Cuban leaders believe in earnest that their country is the planet's last stronghold of socialism and reiterate, like an incantation, the once attractive slogan "Socialism or death!" Haven't there been enough deaths on the "blazing continent" and on the Freedom Island itself to deliberately doom its citizens to death? Where is logic and common sense if the ideals of humanism have tarnished? Socialism is supposed to be "the most humane" system, and a democratic one, too.

The dismal 40-year record of "real socialism" in East European countries has found its reflection in the fates of their Communist leaders. A look at their fates will be most instructive: the longer the given leader has been in power, and the greater the responsibility he bears for the "ensuing consequences," the more tragic his fate.

Characteristically, all of them started out as convinced members of the opposition, persecuted and anathematized. Towards the end of the road, the convictions were either "worn out" or discarded altogether. Well, power is corrupting. Unfortunately, this truth is eternal.

Drawing from The Atlantic Magazine (USA)

In his declining years, Todor Zhivkov, toppled from power, publicly repented of his past record and admitted the fallacy of the idea that socialism is the alternative to capitalism. In other words, he dismissed his own life cause as a mistake. A veteran of the guerrilla movement, an organizer of the anti-fascist uprising of September 9, Zhivkov headed the party and the state for 35 years. He was stripped of all

his titles and decorations "for gross violations of the PRB Constitution, legality, and socialist morality," for mistakes which led to "profound social and economic deformations in the country."

During the quarter of a century that he ruled Romania, Ceausescu, with his clan, became an odious figure and antagonized even the most tolerant ones. Nevertheless, the execution of the Ceausescus without trial, much as the couple deserved it, made the civilized world shudder.

Erich Honecker, an ailing old man, can only evoke compassion. Whatever one thinks of the former GDR, it is only by a stretch of the imagination that Honecker can be put in a class with, say, Ceausescu. It would appear, however, that they won't even give him a chance to die in peace in his native land.

Only Janos Kadar and Gustav Husak managed to "save face," to a certain extent. It wasn't only that Kadar resigned from his post without waiting to be toppled, and that Husak, known as a leader of the Slovak National Uprising and as a martyr of the political repressions of the fifties, did not, as distinct from his East European "colleagues," hold all the top Party and government posts in the two years preceding "the tender revolution". In his time, Husak has made every effort to save his compatriots, who had been active in the Prague Spring movement, from punishment. That wasn't forgotten. Nor was it forgotten in Hungary that Janos Kadar had initiated the reforms which enabled the country to far outstrip the other Soviet satellites socially and economically, and which were not stopped even after the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 which gave the whole "socialist camp" a bad scare. It was precisely Kadar who was the first among the camp's leaders to paraphrase the notorious slogan as "Who is not against us is with us." Hundreds of thousands of Hungarians bade him the last farewell.

Velasco Alvarado reached the end of the road abandoned by all. The general admitted defeat and withdrew from the political scene. His name remained unblemished: By having decided to stay in Casa de la Moneda on September 11, 1973, Salvador Allende covered himself with undying fame. The stamp of the courage and sense of honour he displayed at that moment of truth is borne by the Popular Unity, compensating somewhat for the negative sides of its activity. Maurice Bishop fell victim to his own mistakes. A victim in the literal sense of the word – a bullet through the heart makes a martyr out of a politician. The Sandinistas were the Third World's only adherents of socialist ideals to wind up their experiment with dignity, in the best traditions of "civil society."

Fidel Castro is hopelessly behind the times... I remember a fleeting encounter with him at the 26th CPSU Congress. He told me then that the people of Cuba would never swerve from the socialist road they had chosen. In just a few minutes of the interview, with photoflashes "exploding" all around, I sensed the magnetism of his personality. This, apart from his romantic image of a "revolutionary fighter," attractive to Latin Americans, is probably what he owes his popularity to... But struggle cannot, and should not, last forever. Even the staunchest fighters will break down if it does. Why does Fidel ignore this simple truth and offer such fierce resistance to any attempts at reforming the ailing society? The need for such reforms has long been pressing. Why doesn't he resign with dignity? If he does, he will remain in the Cubans' social memory as an outstanding statesman, in a class with his great predecessors whose names served as the banner of the July 26 Movement... Fidel once referred to Jose Marti as "an apostle of freedom," and the famous storming of Moncada barracks was timed for the Marti centenary. Today the name of Marti is borne by the Cuban emigrants' radio station and TV channel who regard it as their mission to help free Cuba from Fidel Castro and his regime.

What motivates him? His convictions? If they become blinkers, they are not convinctions any more but fanaticism. And fanatics of all kinds are equally dangerous. It is hard to believe that Castro is ignorant of the real situation on the island once described by poets as "a pearl of the seas," where now even the "guajiro," the Cuban peasant who had traditionally fed the nation, does not have enough to eat. Or does his entourage "mislead" him as Stalin's did the Soviet dictator, according to his admirers?.. This is incredible: the Comandante is too shrewd and worldly-wise to let anyone do that to him. This is especially true since he, a pragmatic politician, could not fail to see the distortions and flaws of the Soviet model of socialism which the Cuban one was largely based upon.

Is Castro too ambitious, too attached to his "throne," perhaps? "History will justify me" – these words, uttered by Fidel three and a half decades ago, would have come true had he embarked on reforms in time. Well, he didn't. Nor are any reforms in the offing now, judging by the results of the recent 4th Congress of the Cuban Communist Party which has defiantly reaffirmed its "purity" and its monopoly on power. No one has ever expected the high priests of the system to transform. Nevertheless, the resolutions of the high forum cannot but raise many eyebrows: it looks as if the Cuban leaders have lost all common sense; they are still trying to put a death scare into their compatriots who can no longer bear the burden of socialism. This is a case of obsessive wishful thinking...

Fidel will no longer be able to cure a society undermined by his own revolution. He has missed his chance. Reforms are inevitable, but the credit for them will go to others. Nevertheless, the Comandante still has an option. The only worthy course open to him is to manfully accept what's inexorably coming. If he does, history may "justify him" after all...

Yelena Gorovaya

The jackal is hiding in Syria

Ilich Ramirez Sanchez thinks he is a victim of *perestroika*. His empire of terrorists crumbled after changes swept Eastern Europe

President Hafez Assad of Syria does not extradite friends. Whatever authority might issue the arrest warrant, neither the Syrian foreign ministry nor its law-enforcing agencies will ever bother to consider it. Damascus will only spread its hands in a gesture of helplessness: no such person is in Syria.

People who have loyally served President Assad can be sure of their personal safety. This applies to Sturmbanführer of Waffen SS Alois Brunner who trained the Syrian security service, and to the 20th century's most well-known terrorist, Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, alias Carlos, who used to carry out the Syrian president's special assignments and is alleged to have retired now.

Ten years ago the newspapers wrote that Carlos was killed by rivals. Carlos was buried and forgotten. The Interpol and European police forces, however, thought that Carlos was hiding somewhere at Palestinian bases in Lebanon, Southern Yemen or Syria. As for Carlos, he was travelling across Eastern Europe. State borders, tightly sealed for others, were no obstacle for Carlos and his people. Moscow, Damascus and Berlin always knew where Carlos was and what he was doing at any given moment.

A pistol kept in the embassy

The world had not seen worse bureaucrats than officials of the GDR's Ministry of State Security, better known as Stasi. Officials from Stasi's Department 22 which for some reason was called the anti-terrorism department were closely following Carlos' every step. Carlos was crossing borders showing Syrian or Southern Yemeni diplomatic passports (each time a new one) which allowed him to avoid customs control. The punctual Germans were displeased: one of Carlos' men showed two different passports to one and the same receptionist at East Berlin's Palast-Hotel within the space of several days. The hotel administration were dismayed. Carlos himself had a very peculiar notion of entertainment: he was fond of shooting at the ceiling of his hotel room and had a reputation as a womanizer. Said one Stasi report on him: "The revealed contacts with citizens of the Democratic Republic have been of intimate character with persons of the female sex." "In response to this information the Syrian side confirmed that such a lifestyle had been sanctioned by supreme Syrian authorities," wrote an officer at Stasi's Department 22.

Stasi was closely cooperating with sham diplomats from the Syrian embassy. Noted a report to the Stasi leadership: "A stable contact has been established with Third Secretary of the Syrian Embassy (a secret service officer) Nabil Shritah, who is in charge of keeping materials for the group (of Carlos), a pistol with ammunition, and spare passports. Shritah is authorized by the Syrian Secret Service to render assistance to the group."

Carlos and his people had little use for the embassy pistol. They never went about unarmed, which was a great annoyance to Stasi officers.

East German Communists had never doubted what the main occupation of the Carlos group was. The only reason for displeasure in East Berlin was the Carlos people's poor discipline: "It is only upsetting that there is little order in the group and that little attention is being paid to political interests and security requirements. The promises to maintain secrecy are often ignored." As for the rest, Stasi was completely satisfied and its support to Carlos was guaranteed.

Communists ask Carlos for help

His photos decorate any police station in Western Europe and there is no way he can sneak behind the

In 1982, Magdalena Kopp, Carlos' accomplice and future wife, was brought to trial in Paris. The ringleader tried to turn the French capital into a realm of terror

Iron Curtain. He is deprived of the pleasure of shooting on or throwing grenades at unarmed people. However, he has the privilege of ordering others to kill. He is in charge of a part of the Syrian-controlled Palestinian network in Western Europe and West German terrorists from the Revolutionare Zellen – an organization that was formed in 1976 and pledged to fight imperialism and world Zionism.

"Is there any international organization of terrorists?" police officers asked each other, trying to understand who supplied the terrorist groups with false documents, arms and explosives, where the terrorists vanished while the police forces of the entire Western world were hunting for them. The press of socialist countries never tired of accusing the CIA of sponsoring international terrorism. In the professional language this is known as a cover-up operation.

Stasi documents leave no room for doubt: international terrorism was always sponsored by socialist countries.

East European capitals were the ideal place to meet future killers. It was there that Carlos gave his people weapons and explosives and explained plans for operations. It was there that terrorists fled after operations to get new documents and leave for the Middle East.

East Berlin was regarded the most convenient place. Carrying diplomatic passports, the Carlos people easily passed Allied checkpoints into the West. Using this route, they escaped from the police into the East. On the other side of the Iron Curtain they were bandits and killers, while in the Democratic Republic and other socialist countries they were welcomed as guests of honour.

Carlos was always ready to repay hospitality. The Romanian secret service, Securitate, provided his group with a house in Bucharest, weapons, money and forged passports. Shortly after that three Romanian opposition leaders who had fled from Ceausescu to the West were sent bombs wrapped as parcels.

Stasi bureaucrats prepared a detailed report about Carlos' plans to blow up Radio Free Europe which was a regular annoyance to the Communist regimes. The bomb went off on February 21, 1981.

Communist regimes did not have enough money to feed an impoverished population, but there was never any shortage of funds for "anti-imperialist struggle." And money, along with a free and sweet life has always been the main aim for Carlos.

The first shot and first bomb

Carlos' grandfather took part in the Venezuelan revolution of 1899. His father, Jose Allagracia Sanchez, was consistent when he called his three sons Vladimir, Ilich and Lenin. The son named Ilich who was born on October 12, 1949, grew up to become the world's No. 1 terrorist.

Sanchez Senior was not only a Marxist, but also a millionaire who had made a fortune on realty speculations. Carlos was growing up as a home revolutionary with an unconcealed craving for luxury. He could have remained nothing but a playboy with revolutionary inclinations, had he not joined the pro-Communist movement of Venezuelan students and received an invitation to visit a Cuba training camp. The camp was operated by Fidel Castro's secret service and association with it shaped the further career of Ilich from Venezuela.

In 1968 the Communist Party sent Carlos to study at Moscow's Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University. Some researchers believe that the KGB recruited Ilich. However, it does not seem likely that the KGB branch controlling the Peoples' Friendship University would have been recruiting people at random, and in those years Carlos was still nothing special. A playboy with puffy cheeks, young Carlos

was spending his father's money to buy the *dolce vita* in Moscow. Another thing is more important than Carlos' unlikely association with the KGB: while at the University he made friends with Palestinians who invited him to visit their camp in Jordan.

At the end of the 1960s most left-wing radicals decided to support the Palestinian cause. In their eyes, the Palestinians and the Vietnamese were victims of world imperialism. Besides, the Palestinians suggested action, not discussion. The radicals liked this, too. They were trained in Palestinian camps and provided with Soviet- or Czech-made weapons and money that was coming from rich Arab countries. After that they were sent to Europe to plant bombs, kill people and hijack planes.

Still dangerous but no more needed Carlos lives in this house in Damascus guarded like the President's residence

In Jordan Carlos joined one of the most radical organizations – The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, headed by George Habbash, a frequent guest of Moscow. Carlos fought together with Palestinian fighters in September 1970 when King Hussein ordered his army to throw Palestinians out of Jordan. Palestinians abused the King's hospitality and behaved like masters in Jordan, hijacking planes and using weapons. Carlos became especially close to a friend of Habbash's, physician Wadi Haddad. It was Haddad who decided that fighting the unarmed unsuspecting Americans and Europeans was more effective than fighting Israel which was always ready to repel an attack.

Wadi Haddad sent Carlos to London where Ilich's mother lived. She introduced Carlos to high society where no one was suspicious of the young and rich playboy from Latin America. A year after he arrived in London Carlos carried out his first terrorist attack: he went to the house of one pro-Israeli figure and killed him by shooting point-blank in his face. A month later Carlos planted a bomb in the London branch of the Israeli Bank. The bomb went off wounding a typist. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine proudly advertised its "powerful blows at the Zionist enemy."

Carlos' brilliant career started after he took over from Mohammad Boudia who headed the PFLP's European network and supplied money and weapons to the Italian Red Brigades, West Germany's Rote Armee Fraktion and Bewegung 2 Juni, and the Turkish People's Liberation Army. Finally, Israeli intelligence got rid of Boudia by planting a bomb in his car.

Traitors don't live long

Carlos started creating his own network with the help of his numerous lovers who stored explosives and weapons for him or kept secret flats. The West German terrorist organization Revolutionare Zellen was Carlos' main European ally.

In 1974 Carlos came to Paris and turned the French capital into a realm of terror. In August he planted bombs in the offices of three newspapers which did not support the Palestinian cause. In September he helped friends from the Japanese Red Army seize the French Embassy in The Hague to force the French government to release a Japanese terrorist. Carlos himself tossed a grenade into a group of young people as he rode past in a car. The explosion left two dead and several wounded. Carlos promised that he would repeat the attack and the French government surrendered.

The police were hunting for Palestinians or West Germans known for their left-wing radical convictions. No one seemed interested in the Venezuelan. The Lebanese police drew the attention of their French counterparts to a suspicious designer named Michael Moukharbel who shuttled between Beirut and Paris. He was believed to be a Haddad courier. Actually, though, Moukharbel did not only relay Haddad's orders to Carlos, but also acted as Carlos' accountant. His notebook, where he registered every minutest purchase Carlos made, including tram tickets, would later help the French police understand who the man they needed was.

Moukharbel arrived in Paris on June 13, 1975. The police followed him immediately and managed to take a picture of him chatting with Carlos at the apartment belonging to Wilfried Böse, the Revolutionare Zellen leader who had helped Palestinians organize the killing of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics of 1972.

The French expelled Böse to West Germany. They also arrested Moukharbel, but before they extradited him they wanted to know more about the young man chatting with Moukharbel in the picture.

The Lebanese agreed to take the police to the apartment where he thought Carlos could be found. The apartment belonged to one of Carlos' girl friends who was giving a party that night.

The police commissar was warmly met and offered a drink. He spent ten minutes chatting with Carlos who was playing the guitar, and then decided to ask him to come to the police station. Before that, however, the commissar ordered two inspectors to bring Moukharbel in from the flight of stairs where he was waiting flanked by the police.

Carlos asked if he could use the bathroom and appeared from there carrying a pistol. The police were unarmed. Carlos shot at the Lebanese twice, then killed both inspectors and seriously wounded the commissar.

Carlos spent the rest of the night with another woman and then his old friends from the Cuban intelligence service working as diplomats in Paris helped him escape to Algeria.

The Entebbe failure

On December 21, 1975, Carlos headed a group of three Palestinians and two Germans from Revolutionare Zellen and kidnapped ministers participating in the OPEK conference in Vienna.

The terrorists killed three people during the attack. One of them was killed by Carlos – a confused Libyan who had been so heavily indoctrinated by Arab propaganda that he decided that the conference had been raided by Israelis.

One of Carlos' assistants, Hans-Joachim Klein of Revolutionare Zellen, was wounded and later quit terrorism. Said he of Carlos: "At first I'd taken him to be an Italian Mafioso. I was flabbergasted by his collection of guns, hand grenades, and exp-

losives. There were special pistols with silencers that killed all noise when you fired the pistols. There was not even the sound of the breechlock sliding. I was impressed by the guns which seemed to have been taken out of a James Bond movie, but they were real things. And I was also impressed by that guy who demonstrated his lethal collection with a high society ease...

"He was a very cool guy... He always dressed very stylishly and stayed at luxury hotels... When he saw from the Wanted posters in Germany that the price on his head was no larger than that on anyone else's he said that he was going to write a letter of protest... He compares himself with the character of the Jackal in Forsyth's book..."(*The Day of the Jackal* – **Ed.**)

In June 1976 Carlos organized his last large operation. Two Palestinians and two Germans – Carlos' old friend Wilfried Böse and his girl friend Brigitte Kuhlmann hijacked a French airbus flying from Tel Aviv.

They brought the plane to the Ugandan city of Entebbe and demanded that Israel release the convicted terrorists, threatening to blow up the plane with 103 passengers. The leaders of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine came to Entebbe to congratulate the terrorists on their victory. However, an Israeli commando unit arrived at Entebbe at night, having crossed the African continent in order to free the hostages. Several terrorists including Wilfried Böse were killed in the storming.

On his own

Carlos assumed the leadership of Revolutionare Zellen making it the nucleus of his compact army. He was fed up with carrying out somebody else's orders and was on his own. At first, he sold himself to Qaddafi but he did not like the Libyans. He said it was impossible to work with them because they did not keep their word. He was welcomed in Baghdad, but Carlos did not manage to successfully cooperate with Saddam either: the Iraqis demanded that he follow only their instructions.

In the spring of 1978 Wadi Haddad, Carlos' godfather in terrorism, died in an East Berlin hospital. Several people of Haddad joined Carlos who by that time had found a new patron: the president of Syria, Hafez Assad.

Hafez Assad sheltered as many terrorist groups as Colonel Qaddafi ever had, but unlike the Libyan leader he never admitted to sponsoring international terrorism. Hafez Assad controlled the cruellest Palestinian groups of Abu Nidal, Abu Musa and Ahmed Jibril.

Colonel Qaddafi reminds one of a maniac always ready to use his knife. General Assad keeps his sword concealed and uses it when the enemy least expects it.

Assad came to power as a result of the twentieth coup in Syria's 20th century history. He values professional terrorists, capable of catching their victims unawares and striking fatal blows, but himself coming from a small Alawite community, he knows when it is better to take up the sword and when it is better to make a deal with the enemy.

President Assad is no altruist. If he armed Palestinian groups, he then used them to achieve his own ends. When Assad decided to deploy Syrian troops in Lebanon in 1976 he first sent Palestinians there. In 1985 when King Hussein and weakened Arafat tried to start talking peace with Israel, Damascus-based Palestinian groups were instructed to eliminate Jordanian diplomats and moderate followers of Arafat. Assad did much to split the Palestinian movement and influence it.

Assad found a use for Carlos, too. In 1982 the opposition composed of former members of his party and the Moslem Brothers staged a rebellion in the city of Hama. The army and the security forces crushed the rebellion. According to various sources, the number of victims varied from 5,000 to 30,000. After that Assad instructed Carlos to eliminate Syrian opposition leaders who had fled to Europe.

Ilich out of business

In Berlin Carlos became intimate with Magdalena Kopp who had abandoned her daughter in the name of revolutionary struggle. They spent the first night together at the East Berlin Palast-Hotel under the virtually complete control of Stasi which kept recording even the slightest rustling in their room.

Magdalena Kopp was Carlos' partner in terrorism as well as in bed. When she and one more terrorist were arrested in Paris Carlos wrote a letter to the government of France.

"You have arrested two members of my organization who had not been instructed to operate in France, because we have nothing against the Socialist government of France. I give you a month to free them.

Ilich Ramirez Sanchez."

Several days before the deadline a bomb went off in a Paris-Toulon train killing five passengers. One of the places in the compartment where the bomb went off had been booked by Jacques Chirac who had decided to travel by air at the very last moment. Shortly before New Year two more bombs went off at the Marseilles Railway Terminal and in the Paris–Marseilles express. Five people were killed and fifty wounded. A French diplomat and his wife were killed in Beirut. Bombs went off in the French embassy and the Vienna office of Air France.

Carlos supervised this campaign of terror from Damascus and East Berlin where Stasi officers regularly informed their bosses about what the esteemed guest was doing. The East German politburo was not in the least repelled by aiding criminals. Actually, no politburo in the socialist camp was. Carlos and killers like him were assisted not only by Moscow and Sofia cynics, but also by the regime of liberal Janos Kadar who was so much respected in Hungary and the whole world.

Magdalena Kopp and her accomplice were sentenced to five years in prison but were soon set free. Kopp was expelled to West Germany and soon arrived in Damascus via Berlin. Nine months after the jubilant meeting of the lovers Magdalena gave birth to Carlos' daughter.

However, Carlos' criminal empire started crumbling as reforms swept Eastern Europe. Hungary was the first to reject Carlos' services and soon all Eastern Europe became closed to him. He immediately became worthless in the eyes of Assad.

Reporters from Stern found and took pictures of Carlos' heavily-guarded house in Damascus. Still dangerous but no more needed Carlos lives in his three-storey house in virtual confinement. People who know so much often die in accidents, but Carlos insured himself against them. He once told his assistant, Klein, that he had hidden some important documents in a safe place somewhere. That is why Assad does not want Carlos to elude his control. The President knows how dangerous jackals can be.

Leonid Mlechin

Photo from Stern (Germany)

POLEMICS

"The Russian organicists" – living by the juice of alien soil

Official Russian "patriots" Belov, Bondarev and Rasputin believe that democracy and liberalism will destroy Russia. It may be saved only with the help of their prescription, which is dearer to them than their Motherland

Boris Paramonov

...On second thought one comes to the conclusion that this movement no longer has cultural perspectives. Russian life has changed too radically and drastically. It has lost that quality of devotion to the organic national soil which inspired great classics of Russian culture in their time and, frankly speaking, was largely invented and fashioned by them as early as the 19th century. An example of such a stylization is furnished by Dostoyevsky, who had to deal with a new man but tried to draw him forcibly back to this organic soil. Because this new man, as well as Dostoyevsky himself, felt uncomfortable in the new world, this new world was dubbed in Russian literature bourgeois; however, this sociological definition did not encompass all its dimensions, for it was primarily a world of a free individual, who had broken away with living an organically vegetable life on patriarchal soil. Needless to say, this "organicity," as well as "organic" mythology of the soil, have come into being as a psychological compensation.

In the position of an "ethnic minority"

All this applies equally to the communist period in Russian history, when not only all organicity, but everyday life itself as well as life in general were flung into some abstract space which you may term however you like – cosmic or vacuum, for instance. Under these conditions the so-called "village" prose played a very important role of an "anti-communist manifesto" of a sort. Yet juxtaposing patriarchal virtues of artificially galvanized peasantry mummified like Lenin's cadavre to the new and free Russian life is, as a cultural position, doomed to oblivion, disregard and possibly even scorn.

Yet unfortunately, the Russian "organicists," nationalists or patriots, as they prefer to style themselves, still retain certain political opportunities to continue to exist as a compact group. I say "unfortunately" because their further existence is possible only if the hardships and misfortunes of our present Soviet life are prolonged. This tendency is already clearly discernible. Colonel Alksnis began to display unusual activity after the abortive coup. One time he appeared on American TV almost every day for a week. He is one of the leaders of the imperially-oriented faction Soyuz in the Union parliament which, by all appearances, has ceased to be. However, Alksnis and his imperially-minded comrades-in-arms have not calmed down and, most distressing, they still have political chances connected with the unstable situation created by the accelerated dismantling of the Soviet Union. 25 to 30 million Russians live outside Russia. What will become of them? There is reason for worry as even in the Baltics, whose devotion to democracy is beyond doubt, there have been alarming signs. For example, almost half of Latvia's population are not Letts, who are a minority in its capital Riga. In this situation the new Latvian legislators are quite serious about the issue of depriving the non-autochthons of the right to citizenship in the newly-independent state. One may and must hope that the Baltic peoples will not indulge in any excesses, yet objectively, the situation becomes rather tense.

A special concern is aroused by the situation in the Central Asian republics, which is connected by Russian mass media with the phenomena of the so-called feudal communism, alias national communism. This phenomenon certainly merits a special discussion; for the time being we will confine ourselves to touching upon only one circumstance. We have already mentioned more than once that the problem of national movements in the Union is a secondary one and that the hidden motive behind these movements is hatred for communism and the desire to get rid of it by all means, the national issue providing the most convenient of all possible ways to shake it off. Suddenly there came an avalanche of secessions. It might have seemed that the above-mentioned attitude had been discredited once and for all – no more communism in Russia while republics continue seceding one after another. But there is one more unfortunate circumstance: those seceding are mostly Communists who are eager to preserve their chairs under the guise of legitimate fighters for national independence. Hence the absence and the impossibility of trust in these leaders, especially on the part of the Russians who live on the territory of the republics that have seceded. Anything may be expected from these feudal communists, including discrimination against the Russian population.

Advantageous misfortunes

And here opportunities present themselves for the above-mentioned patriots. They will fight

The voice of Boris Paramonov

I've never met him or seen him, but it seems to me that I've known him for a long time and rather intimately – such is, evidently, the nature of modern communication by radio broadcasts. Paramonov is the author and host of Radio Liberty's years-long series to which he gave the title, both exhaustive and all-embracing, of "The Russian idea." The series matches well with its author – it encompasses philosophy and literary criticism, theology and psychoanalysis, sociology and politics.

Boris Paramonov is a thinker, a bright personality in humanities. The flight of his associations – unexpected and paradoxical – is free and easy. Yet his lofty essayistic approach is always topical and comprehensive.

This must be a subjective impression; however, in my perception he occupies the place next to the unforgettable Sergei Dovlatov, whatever the differences between their creative ways – the former is a scholar, whereas the latter a man of letters. What makes them akin is, in my opinion at least, the scope and originality of their personalities.

The voice, the individual hues of timbre, free mastery of this surprising instrument of thought expression – word – recalls the image of an educated Russian person of that passing generation which our land has always been proud of. It is the image of a St. Petersburgian or old Muscovite professor so different from ourselves of today, blinded with blinkers of normative knowledge...

In calling the readers' attention to this extensive abstract from one of Paramonov's recent programmes, I was motivated not so much by the desire to familiarize them with this outstanding representative of Russian emigration – till recently a resident of Leningrad and now a citizen of the USA – as primarily by the doubtless topical nature of the excerpt. More than that – I am convinced that the very stylistic character of his texts presupposes that in addition to their auditive perception, they will also be read, carefully and thoughtfully. As for a broadcast – it invades, pervades and evades. No surprise – it's only on air...

Rudolf Borecki,
Professor,
D.Sc. (Philology)

under the banner of protection of the Russian population in the republics and promote irredentism of all kinds exploiting the problem.

Organicists, adherents of the idea of a strong state and patriots readily quoted Stolypin to counter their democratic opponents: "They want great upheavals, but we want a Great Russia." However, it turns out nowadays that in order to save their political face and preserve their right to existence, these patriots need primarily not a Great Russia, but precisely great revolutionary upheavals, because there will be simply no place for them left on the political scene if Democrats manage to solve all the problems in store for them. For that very reason stability in general and a happy solution of the Russian issue in republics in particular are politically disadvantageous for the patriots.

In one of his appearances on American TV, Colonel Alksnis affirmed that the country was on the brink of civil war, famine and epidemics. The way he spoke produced the unmistakable impression that he personally, as well as the political group he belonged to, would profit from such developments. There is nothing left to patriots Belov, Bondarev and Rasputin except to join Alksnis' imperially minded followers. Can it really be true that their only chance of salvation is through famine, civil war and epidemics?

No one, myself included, can doubt Rasputin's, Belov's or Bondarev's patriotic feelings; however, they don't want Democrats and liberals as Russia's rescuers. They want to rescue their Fatherland exclusively in conformity with their own formula, which is dearer to them than their Fatherland. This is exactly what may be called their ideological madness, not to mention reasons other than ideological ones — something needs to be done to remain afloat, to prevent one's voice being silenced regardless of what the voice says.

A "native song" on a German tune

History supplies us with many an example of one's wounded pride becoming a powerful negative political factor. The main leading core of the German National Socialist Party was made of such unacknowledged talents, and Goebbels' case is highly demonstrative here. Not long ago his novel *Michael,* written in 1923, was published in the United States. I've read it. It can't be called absolutely vapid, to be more exact, a good tradition is evident in this book — the tradition of German romanticism from Jens to Nietzsche with its two principal intentions — apology of soil and blood and exaltation of activism of any kind. One Russian writer once mentioned "canned former inspirations." These words seem to be said precisely about Goebbels' book. Actually, all our present organicity, all this village prose and the ideology it became covered with are also "bygone inspirations canned."

The remarkable book of American philosopher Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer,* treats extensively the psychology of wrecks who compensate their individual failure by professing a collectivist faith and cultivate in themselves a feeling of participation in a great common cause. The German Fascists were smart enough to link socialist ideas highly popular early in this century with the idea of common destiny. They singled out from socialism not the aspect of class confrontation, but the element of human oneness and solidarity, justifying the necessity of this solidarity by the misfortunes that had befallen Germany humiliated by the victors of WWI. Hence the NATIONAL Socialism.

A comparison of the German situation of those days with present-day Russia yields coincidences both embarrasing and conducive to concern. The principal element of these coincidences is the destiny of the blood-kin living in foreign territories. The Sudetengebiet in Czecho-Slovakia is somewhat reminiscent of the Russian-populated regions of Kazakhstan; the strongly russified region of the Donetsk coal basin resembles the Saar coal field, likewise a centre of coal mining industry whose residents voted for reunification with Germany in 1934. If not the Ukraine, Byelorussia at least may be visualized in the role of Austria as the object of a possible Anschluss. Something like the Danzig corridor can be found, too, if so desired, suffice it to turn to the strip of land connecting Russia with Klaipeda, which will easily pass for a new Danzig. All these parallels lie on the surface. Who will dare insist that these ideas have never dawned upon Bondarev, Belov or Kunyayev and that any ethnic tension in these regions doesn't prompt them to stipulate a corresponding policy?

* * *

All this does not mean that the perspectives of Russia's future political development should be visualized on this way. It's only a matter of the line of political behaviour dictated to the pillars of the Russian philosophy of organic soil, their logic of ideological self-determination. Nor does it follow that these Russian problems are non-existent. Unfortunately, they do exist, but the mental habits and the already accumulated luggage of political behaviour so specific for the organicists will prompt them the worst of all possible solutions. They have driven themselves into the blind alley of national socialism. Is it so necessary to explain and decifer the meaning of the constituents of this bipartite formula? Its **nationalism** is unquestionable. But the organicists' devotion to collectivist mythology leads to the inevitable conclusion about these people's residual **socialist** essence. Certainly, they still have a chance to find a way out of this dead end. But for this to be possible they will have to reject their claims to possession of the only salutary formula of Russia's future.

Drawing by Arkady Gursky

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EAST VIEW
PUBLICATIONS

Talkov is dead but "Pamyat" (Memory) lives on

The "Russian officer of song" fought "the servants of Satan" but died at the hands of an ordinary mafioso, moreover of the same clan...

As over the last week of the subscription campaign the mass media has been so greatly engrossed by the Backstage Murder and getting the reader to hang on every word, quite a few really great writers and actresses passed away unnoticed. Their deaths were not attended by any scuffles with bodyguards, croaks on the head with the butt of a revolver, a long-legged songstress and mistress of the murder suspect or even the toilet bowl into which the murder weapon is usually plunged according to the laws of cheap drama.

One indeed finds it hard to get rid of the feeling that we have been shown a hardboiled commercialized video, inasmuch as all the attributes are there, with even the white carnation in the pool of blood below the mirror.

However, this was all real. Igor Talkov is dead. No posthumous glory is worth more than life...

Agatha Christie baffled

Upon a cursory glance the murder that occurred at the St.Petersburg Yubileiny Palace on October 6, would seem an easy nut for the analytical criminalist to crack. No doubt Agatha Christie's favourite Miss Marple would have spotted the murderer in the blink of an eye. One need but compare the testimonies, put the brain to work, and who was lying and who was telling the truth would be absolutely clear. Pure deduction, as Sherlock Holmes would infer...

Indeed, Miss Marple would have immediately understood that Aziza could have never discovered the revolver in the toilet bowl and that hence the person claiming she did was lying. Next Talkov's manager was standing so that he should have seen the murder in the looking-glass: if he didn't what could have distracted him? And so on, and so forth...

However when your correspondent suggested all that to the St.Petersburg detectives urging them to abide by the laws of logic, they snorted into the earpiece and sceptically assessed the old lady's chances in this given case. "Miss Marple won't do," they said.

A posthumous political figure

Indeed, the testimonies are so confused and contradictory, that even the Queen of Mystery Writers would have scarcely been able to invent it all.

Version Number One. After their quarrel in the dressing-room over who should take the stage first, Talkov or Malakhov's protege Aziza, the two "tumbled out into the corridor, hitting one another." Realizing that he would not be able to overpower his opponent, Talkov fired his gas pistol, to which Malakhov responded by shooting his revolver.

Version Number Two. The scuffle between Talkov and Malakhov erupted at the dressing-room and ended after the first blood was spilt which must have been that of Malakhov, as he now demonstrates the scar he got on his head after being struck with a revolver butt. Talkov headed towards the stage, pausing in front of a mirror to tidy himself up, and at that moment Malakhov fired his gun. Some say it was some 25 metres away from the dressing-room, others say that the killer had gotten quite close.

Version Number Three. After rudely telling off Talkov in the dressing-room, Malakhov emerged into the corridor with one of the singer's bodyguards and began to threaten him with his gun. Talkov ran out with his gas pistol to help and was killed on the spot.

Version Number Four. Talkov told his bodyguards to "chuck out that rubbish," meaning Malakhov, from the dressing-room. A scuffle broke out which then continued in the corridor. Several of Talkov's bodyguards began to beat up Aziza's admirer, while the singer himself hit him on the head with the butt of his gun. Malakhov was knocked down. Blinded by the shots coming from the gas pistol, he fired his own gun twice at random and hit Talkov.

Version Number Five. This is Malakhov's own story which differs from the foregoing version only as regards his account of the finale. He alleges that he fired at the floor, that his gun was wrested from him, and that somebody else taking advantage of the general confusion, shot Talkov. Indeed when interviewed, Aziza also hinted that in the crowd around Talkov at the moment far from all were his friends.

May the detectives forgive me for airing my own considerations. Hardly would Malakhov, once in Talkov's dressing-room, have started to swear at Talkov, as he, no novice who but recently had been knifed by Dagestanians at the Ukraina Hotel restaurant, would not try to face up to the overwhelming odds presented by Talkov and his bodyguards. Rather he had been "rudely told off," as Talkov and his men were annoyed by Aziza's desires. In short, what broke out was what Aziza called "a men's row" with the beaten Malakhov catching at his gun...

Igor Malakhov – not much of an agent of world Zionism

Aziza: "I'm a poor little girl from Tashkent"

Though Malakhov has not been detained and was only asked to sign an affidavit not to leave town, that cannot be taken as proof of his innocence. In the eyes of the law the only charge, which is thus far indisputable, is that of the unlawful possession of a weapon, which under Article 218 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code carries a sentence of up to five years of deprivation of liberty. An adroit lawyer will unquestionably seek to establish that Malakhov acted in self defence, which under Article 105 of the said Criminal Code, carries a sentence of up to two years of deprivation of liberty or of corrective labour up to a term of one year, the lawyer may also establish that Malakhov did not know that Talkov's gas pistol was real, that after being struck on the head he was in a "highly emotional state" and that if he did kill Talkov it was while in that state, which under Article 104 carries a sentence of up to five years of deprivation of liberty or of corrective labour of up to one year. The prosecution will have a hard time unless more facts come to light and irrefutably prove that "an empty heart beats evenly and the pistol does not tremble in the hand" as the poet put it.

The world of our "stars"

Even what occurred after the fateful shots is described differently.

Talkov programme manager **V.Shliafman**: "I heard the shots and saw that Malakhov had been knocked down. Then I took his gun away from him. Still unaware that Igor had been wounded, in a state of shock I ran into the bath-room and left it there... Aziza, the dressing-room attendant, and another chap started hunting around, found the gun and handed it back to Malakhov..."

Aziza. "The guys in Talkov's dressing-room said they had hidden the gun in the toilet bowl. Then they took it out... They said it should be taken away and they gave it to me as I was standing nearby..."

Why did Talkov's men have to hide the gun? Why did they have to give it to Aziza? Could she have found the gun in the toilet bowl in those few minutes?

My first, possibly mistaken, impression is that had Talkov not died the two sides would have tried to hush up the matter as "a men's row" is common enough in the world of our "stars."

I suspect that Aziza's friend, the kick-boxer-cum-blackmarketeer" Malakhov would have come to terms with Talkov's "team." Indeed, the backstage world which the sad occasion of the singer's death has uncovered, seems a truly dirty place.

Incidentally, according to the *Literaturnaya Rossiya* newspaper, Talkov had "planned to detail in a future article the undercover machinery of show business with its hidden criminal economics." The story of his death became one such article, which millions have read by now. The racketeer Malakhov. The "poor little girl from Tashkent" as Aziza is so fond of calling herself, though she stays in a two-story luxury hotel suite and throws wine glasses at spectators incurring her dislike. A singer who takes a gas pistol along to his concert. Bodyguards prepared to harm anyone on the slightest excuse...

Miss Marple certainly moved in more elegant company...

However, one must agree that this is all highly intriguing. Indeed, our babbitry curiosity as regards the world of showbiz has joined our fondness for mystery stories and our emancipated media have played this up for all its worth. At last the mass media are doing what they are basically supposed to do, that is keeping us abreast of events. The only thing we haven't seen is the row itself. We were shown the wounded Talkov on a stretcher, while Aziza was interviewed about her amours. Naturally, a point here and there was stretched. Before we used to read indignant *Pravda* reports about Western newsmen putting professional mercantile considerations before ethics in their interviews, with Western murderers. Now though one of our more popular publications has offered Malakhov to "phone their offices and come clean," supposedly promising to keep the police informed. Reporters of another publication have interviewed Malakhov by telephone. I think he would even be given a chance to explain things on television.

The murder is front-page stuff...

Vasilyev's own song-and-dance

Igor Talkov made a hit with a lyrical song about meditative willows. His death has turned him into a major political figure.

Thus the *Russky Vestnik* weekly writes under the frontpage headline "Igor Talkov. Russia's Gunned Song"

"Igor Talkov worked for Russia. How many more deaths do we need to come our senses? How many more executed Gumilyovs, harrassed Bloks, Gulag-tortured Klyuevs and cardiac-arrested Shukshins do we need to rise up and no longer silently and submissively tolerate one blow after another and part with Russia's sons killed at the height of their fame?"

All this is headed in the manner of the textbook democrat poet Nekrasov, "How Long?"

May we really rank singer Talkov with Gumilyov, Kluyev and Shukshin? Yet the back page, which is wholly devoted to the Talkov murder, is more garrulous still: "This terrorist act against Russia's patriots may be compared to the attacks on the honour and dignity of V.G.Rasputin, Y.V.Bondarev..." The matter now is not one of Talkov, or the more so of Gumilyov and Shukshin. Even when *Literaturnaya Rossiya* observes: "Killed are Russia's talented sons," it grieves for the living, not for the dead...

"Pamyat" leader Dmitry Vasilyev now hints at a conspiracy: claiming that Talkov's men had sworn that "everything was well organized" – even though it has been clearly established that the clash began and ended within the Yubileiny Palace. The murdered singer is palpably destined for "sainthood" in "Pamyat's" "martyrology," which already includes Ostashvili, who hanged himself in a prison camp.

Talkov was indeed seen at the presentation ceremony of the "Pamyat" newspaper. Wearing the uniform of an old Russian army colonel and sporting four Crosses of St.George, he sat to the left of Vasilyev who introduced him to the audience as "the Russian officer of song." Talkov at the time lauded Vasiliev as "the duke" and his associates as "generals of the 'Pamyat' army staff." We now learn that this "officer of song" has been writing a book entitled *The Monologue,* in which he warns that at the close of the 20th century "the servants of Satan" seek to draw a noose around the neck of the great Russian people...

How piddling to posthumously transform a popular singer into the ideologue of a Russian national movement! Yet when no heroes are there they are invented.

The "Pamyat" promotion campaign, associated with the name of the singer Talkov, will undoubtedly win more plaudits than in the case of Ostashvili, who preferred the loud-hailer to the microphone. True, it seems as if there is little chance of passing off kick-boxer Malakhov as an agent of world Zionism.

Evgeny Anokhin

On revolutions – sexual and otherwise

Anatoly Rubinov

At railway and metro stations, in crowded shops and in other public places, one can sometimes see imposing middle-aged men standing with their overcoats unbuttoned and open wide...

Sexologists and psychiatrists have much in common. In particular, both are good at coining new terms. The term "rodmen," however, was invented by militiamen.

The sexual revolution brought with it peddlers of porno pictures and books, who have rigged up their improvised counters in pedestrian underpasses, and strange individuals whose behaviour and kinks are difficult for a naive ordinary person to understand. It is these individuals who are referred to by militiamen as "rodmen." Why the analogy with the erect rod aerial? I shall try to explain this in a euphemistic yet implicit way, lest I should offend anyone's sensibilities.

... A middle-aged family man, the father of two children, would don his most ancient pair of trousers (which his wife had long intended to relegate to a scrap heap) and disappear from home every Saturday. Even the pockets of those trousers were hopelessly torn up. As a matter of fact, the man did not want them mended. The father of the family went out alone, leaving even the dog behind, and as it later turned out, made a beeline for the nearest general store on Dobryninskaya Square. The merchandise on display there left him totally cold – he looked for a queue, preferably an all-woman one. French bras were on sale there one day, and our hero wormed his way into a crowd of women lining up for them, although he had not a ruble in his torn pockets, of course. After a while one of the ladies felt someone's warm hand touching hers. She recoiled and grabbed at that hot and smooth hand which, she thought, had tried to sneak into her bag. What she clasped her fingers around turned out to be not a hand at all – and the lady let out a shriek. The shriek threw the well-organized queue into utter confusion. The lady explained, at the top of her voice, what had happened to her, and disgustedly held up her profaned palm for inspection.

Concluded. For previous instalments, see issues Nos 41-44



The disturber of the peace failed to extricate himself from the crowd. The women hollered for a militiaman in chorus. He came running and immediately recognized the "rodman," whom he had already warned a week before that he would report him to his wife. The militiaman kept his word, but the wife did not believe him. She justified her husband being there by his intention to make her a gift of a French bra, although she was slightly embarrassed by the fact that he had not a ruble on him and could not possibly have, because the pockets of his old trousers were in tatters. However, the militiaman argued that the hole in the pocket had facilitated direct contact between the "rod" and the lady buyer's hand, and that a few buttons were missing from the man's fly.

The advent of the sexual revolution amazingly coincided with the onset of universal shortages. People are lining up for sausage, cigarettes, furniture, handkerchiefs, and what not. Excitement rises to fever pitch, and the people standing in a queue press together tightly lest any impudent "outsider" should squeeze in. This explains, perhaps, why incidents involving "rodmen" are now reported more frequently. Not that the latter occur in every queue – you won't find them in a crowd of men lining up for cigarettes, only among women waiting for their turn to buy imported lipstick, panties, or children's playsuits.

That was when the Muscovites first learned the new term coined by the militia. They now stay on the alert even in the metro, and give a violent start upon hand contact with something smooth and



warm. In most cases, it is false alarm. Sometimes, however, the "rodmen" do try to make contact in a crowd of passengers getting off the train. At a metro station one day, a woman picked up the radio signal sent out by a "rod aerial." In addition to being sensitive, the woman proved resolute and even aggressive: she grabbed at the "rod" as evidence lest she should be accused of imagining things. As a matter of fact, she dug all her ten nails into the "aerial" so as to damage it and to "set the brands of Cain" on it.

I shall not describe the incident in detail. The particulars are easy to imagine. A crowd gathered, of course: some laughed, others were curious, and still others disgusted. The men who happened by were so ashamed of their "brother" that they preferred to leave him in the lurch. Women eye-witnesses – a hundred of them – dragged the man to the nearest militia station. He tried to deny his guilt, but it was no use: the women knew that his "rod" bore tell-tale marks left by the victim's nails.

The man was put on trial. The court heard out eye-witness accounts. The victim delivered an angry tirade, justifying her cruelty by the fact that she had been accompanied by her under-age daughter. The defendant – a middle-aged engineer, married, a father of two children, a CPSU member with no previous convictions – tried to justify himself, but all was in vain. The file on him included a statement drawn up by a forensic expert – such statements usually assess the damage done to the victim. In that particular case it was hard to tell which party suffered most: the women and her under-age daughter, who had sustained moral damage, or the defendant, upon whom physical injury had been inflicted. The latter circumstance, however, only served to aggravate his guilt. The counsel for the defence made an eloquent speech at the trial. He offered two versions of what had happened. The first version was that the defendant – an engineer with an impeccable record, a family man, a member of the CPSU, never tried in a court of law before – had simply forgotten to button up his fly. The other version was also most convincing: if the court considered the defendant guilty of indecent exposure in public – well, the defendant had committed that act in a state of mental derangement because no man in his right mind would have behaved like that. The prosecutor dismissed both versions. He said that many men were, indeed, prone to forget to button themselves up properly, which, however, did not necessarily serve to stimulate them sexually. The defendant, on the other hand, had been fully aroused and, what's more, harrassed – cynically and in an insulting manner – a woman who was a total stranger to him, and her under-age daughter. If the defendant was ill, the prosecutor went on to say, why then, hasn't any expert confirmation of that been filed?

The engineer had to part with his family for two years. Now he is being "reformed" far from home.

Encounters with "rodmen" are reported ever more frequently. They probably existed way before the outbreak of the sexual revolution, but their escapades passed unnoticed and caused no bursts of indignation. The women they had exposed themselves to did not scream in righteous anger – they simply gave the offender to understand, using sign language, that he should have his head examined. Now that our public has learned the ABC's of sex, it has grown proud and uncompromising. It is prepared to punish the offender. Now one can hear a story about a tall handsome middle-aged man – probably a father with no criminal record – standing at the entrance to the GUM (a department store) with his coat wide open and picking up, with his "rod aerial," waves emanating from passing women. The rascal has figured out, with reason, that shoppers who could get him into trouble – i.e., men – were less observant and would simply pay no attention to him. A Soviet Army lieutenant is reported to have been seen in the square in front of the Kursky railway station. Tall, middle-aged and obviously with no criminal record (otherwise he would not have qualified for the Army), he stood there with his trench coat open, exposing himself to hurrying commuters.

It is on record that teenage "rodmen" are few [illegible] exhibitionists are handsome, prosperous-looking middle-aged men, well built, above-medium height, their features clean-cut, and their facial expression serene. They display extraordinary inventiveness in selecting places to indulge in their hobby, and never pursue any practical ends. On several occasions "rodmen" were spotted even near cemeteries. After being beaten up, some "rodmen" hurry to see a psychiatrist, who open their case histories. Such a "registered mental case" thinks nothing of exposing himself even in the Red Square, confident that being a "looney," he will get away with it. When caught, he would proudly announce that he is "out of the ordinary," shouts back at the scandalized women, and fears nothing but the prospect of being beaten up like Jean-Jacques Rousseau was by laundresses over two centuries ago, before the French Revolution. The great philosopher's drama goes to show that mental derangement does not make handsome and intelligent men intellectually inferior. Young Jean-Jacques, who had behaved so morbidly in front of the laundry women, later became a scientist and a writer, an ordinary (i.e., mediocre) husband and a poor father – he sent his children to a foundling hospital. Later he wrote an educational poem himself, which is not surpris-

ing because new generations have always been raised by those who have made a mess of raising their own children, or have no practical experience of child rearing at all. For instance, an elderly spinster (a virgin, actually) has been running a family column in a modern popular weekly for years, discussing the intimate details of love life and the problems of abortion. She educates her readers in what she has never experienced and what she knows only from hearsay.

No revolution goes without victims. In our own revolution, White terror was followed by Red terror. Without mentioning the Great October Sexual Revolution, which electrified the atmosphere and stimulated desire, its opponents are of the opinion that moral freedom has brought many misfortunes as well as emancipation. Crime dispatches, which have become more frank, do not conceal the number of rapes. Even our papers, which used to write chiefly about socialist competition and about the successes of our agriculture, now carry stories about the wretched women attacked in elevators, in the woods, in a street late at night and even in a public garden near their homes early in the morning. Many are inclined to explain this by the situation which has set in here following the dismantling of the administrative command system, as if that notorious system had compelled men to behave. It is the other way around. The answer lies in statistics, which have gained in frankness. Openness has opened society's eyes to a crime which was considered unmentionable in the "genteel times," when socialist competition was regarded as the most important matter. Rapists do not need the visual aids on sale in pedestrian underpasses. It is not the pictures that have awakened the beast. The papers which tried to put the scare of coming violence in us actually implied that the sexual revolution could do us nothing but harm. Made public, statistics of years ago, then regarded as classified information, revealed that the number of sex crimes has actually diminished. Therefore the idea of revolutionary terror, for all its attractiveness and scientific appeal, should be turned down, like all the victims attributed to statistics which used to be quite reticent as, incidentally, our papers were. Now, too, honest papers are ashamed of reporting lamentable sex-related accidents no one is to blame for, because the parties involved acted with mutual consent. None of Moscow's numerous free papers found space for the following incident, for example.

An ambulance crew, called one afternoon to attend to a heart attack victim, found the man dead. The corpse lay on a bed, stark naked, with his army general's uniform piled up on a chair. The

doctor could no longer be of any help there. However, the woman who had called him insisted that the dead man be carried away to a morgue. The doctor and his assistant said a firm no to her request. Nevertheless, they changed their mind after she told them that her husband was due back from work any moment. The two young men exchanged meaningful glances and, out of sympathy for the woman in her prime who had a weakness for oldsters, complied with her request: they put the corpse on a stretcher and carried it out right at the moment when the woman's husband arrived.

In another incident, a young and nervous couple walked into an ambulance station and, speaking under their breath, asked whether they could see a gynaecologist, preferably a woman, immediately. Unfortunately, only a man gynaecologist was on duty. The girl went ghastly pale and, having taken a brief counsel with her boyfriend, whispered her consent to let a man examine her. With her eyelids drooping, the girl told the doctor that for fear of contracting AIDS or knocking her up, the boy had put on a condom before coitus. When it was all over, the couple discovered, to their dismay, that the rubber had vanished. The doctor promptly remedied the situation. He sat the girl on a gynaecological chair and retrieved the condom in an instant. He didn't have to probe too deeply to find it.

And here is an incident which occurred with the consent of a large company of young people. A boy of seventeen, not much for looks but very tall, publicly put a screw-nut on his penis before going to a dance and announced that he was going to dance with that thing on till the end of the party. He failed to keep his word. In fact, he lasted for only two hours, whereupon he could not even walk, let alone dance. An ambulance came to take him from the club to a hospital, where it turned out that the patient needed the services of a locksmith – a top-skilled gauger, really – as well as those of a doctor. A phone call to a neighbouring plant brought an angry retort that there were no fitters there at that ungodly hour and that the director had long gone home and was probably fast asleep. There was nothing for it but to call the director, who dismissed the request as a silly joke and hung up. Another call and an urgent request for help brought the seriousness of the situation home to the director, who promised to contact his best-gauger who had always helped him out and whose portrait graced the regional Board of Honour. The director managed to talk the craftsman into cooperation, and the latter came over, bringing his tool kit along. They put a snow white smock on him, told him to wash his hands with a brush and soap and to rub them clean with alcohol. The fitter objected to such a waste of alcohol which, he said, could be put to a better use. They promised to give him a bottle after the operation which he was to perform. With a jeweller's precision, the fitter cut steel – while the doctor poured rivanolum on the swollen

member – seeing to it that the nut did not get overheated and that his file did not touch what had to be left intact. The fitter looked proud of the trust put in him.

The operation over, the patient was taken to a hospital, and the fitter got his bottle, as promised. In the meantime, the patient's pals waited in the casualties ward. As he passed them, a man, obviously not a doctor, with a bottleneck sticking out of his coat pocket, uttered a phrase out of a movie about doctors: "the patient will live..."

On another occasion, the services of a jeweller were needed in a hurry.

...A woman, made breathlessly happy by her indefatigable lover, was at a loss for words to say how grateful she was to him. Overcome with passion, she put one of her large circular earrings on his member. He appreciated the refinement of her emotions and smothered her with kisses. In a moment he felt a sharp stab of pain in his loins. They had no rivanolum, the lovers did not even know what rivanolum was, and lost too much time trying to cope with the trouble on their own. By the morning they realized that they could not do without urgent medical help, and went to the nearest polyclinic. The registering clerk could not figure out which doctor to send them to. They decided to try a surgeon. The surgeon examined the patient, took a close look at the young woman with one earring missing, and angrily relegated them to an everyday service shop which opened at eleven. The wretched couple hurried to an ambulance station instead. The case was taken seriously there because the cause of an injury makes no difference to a good doctor. On reflection, nevertheless, they did send an ambulance out to fetch a jeweller – the brother of one of the surgeon's assistants was a goldsmith who made golden rings of any size.

The jeweller arrived soon and gave his sister a hand at the operating table. He did a great job. The delicate operation over, the patient, with his injured limb properly bandaged, refused to stay in the hospital but asked for a sick leave certificate, with his illness diagnosed as flu or simply a cold. Then he waddled out of the hospital, his gait resembling that of one suffering from piles, and returned his generous mistress her gift – mutilated, cut into small fragments, bent. The gift was wrapped up in a piece of paper with the jeweller's address on it in case the girl wanted her earring repaired...

That feat of surgery was accomplished on Saturday, August 17, 1991, two days before the three-day revolution which caused many changes in our life. The putschists' absurd "programme of action" included an encroachment on the gains of the sexual revolution. Having studied their manifesto, economists ridiculed their half-baked plan to change our economy which was on its way to recovery. The peddlers of erotic literature got scared and trembled for days after the defeat of the putschists who, in their ridiculous "Address to the Nation," promised a crackdown on "pornography." Two years before that they had ignored the President's decree aimed against them and offered their "stimulants" in the open, in defiance of elderly puritans and frigid women. On August 19, however, pedestrian underpasses and the near approaches to metro stations were empty of them. They were not to be seen for the three days that followed, and for a few more days after the attempted putsch.

On those tense days no one recalled, of course, the statement made by an anonymous stern-faced Leningrad lady in a Los Angeles–Leningrad "TV Bridge." On the second day of the tank invasion, however, one could plainly see how wrong the lady had been. By that time tankmen got tired of sitting in their cold armoured vehicles. Many of them had never been to Moscow before and had never seen so many beautiful women. At first, they eyed them through observation slits, but the angle of view was too narrow, so they finally lifted the armoured hatches, and their young faces came into view. At first, their helmeted heads emerged, but even they made a favourable impression – and not on girls alone. People saw the faces of shy boys who did not know what they had been sent to the city for, and who couldn't but arouse compassion. Women of all ages offered them ice cream cones, cookies, sweets, cold cuts and sandwiches. Monosyllabic remarks developed into conversations, and initial antagonism gradually gave way to friendliness.

The fate of the putsch had been decided before it was all over with. In the evening of the second day, girls already behaved much more freely towards the embarrassed young tankmen – regardless of the combat-ready guns. The pert ones perched on the edges of armoured personnel carriers, warming green-painted strong steel with their pretty behinds, and the soldiers' faces unfroze. A bit later, some girls ventured to climb all the way to the turrets, and met with no resistance. On the third day, when no one went to work in Moscow, people already knew that all would end well – and even adults often behaved like schoolboys. All the streets leading to the centre throbbed with life, and crowds cheered as a turret hatch door opened to let out a girl, with her hair ruffled but her face beaming with joy. On August 21, all Muscovites were lenient to those girls and only asked whether there was enough space in a tank for "that sort of thing." Only the tanks knew what went on inside them in broad daylight, amid jubilant crowds.

If a revolution interferes with love, it is doomed to failure. Unpopular coups begin with encroachments on the joys of life. Notably, right after the October 1917 revolution, some local government bodies issued anti-sex orders, resolutions and decrees (reprinted by a certain magazine in August, 1991). Seventy years ago, the Russian vocabulary contained fewer foreign words than it does now. The victorious proletariat did not know the word "sex" yet. Otherwise they would have said, as the above-mentioned lady announced on television: "We have no sex in this country." Having sobered up after the victory, the authors of those orders, resolutions and decrees called them off: they finally realized that if the ban on sex, imposed by the revolution, were strictly observed, there would be no one to build communism for, because the human race would cease to procreate.

Drawing by Victor Bogorad

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

For thirteen years psychiatrist **Mikhail Buyanov** has been trying to publish his book *Profession – the Psychiatrist.* Written in 1978 the book has been shown to many publishers, and even to some people in the CC CPSU where it was kept for 18 months. The manuscript of the book has been changing hands, copied, but the author could not publish it until this year.

Mikhail Buyanov, 50, has been working in psychiatry since 1962 and knows all its ins and outs. In the book one will find the history of this science founded, perhaps, by Jesus Christ – the "unsurpassed psychotherapist." The author studies the development of this country's psychiatry that, unfortunately, was not affected by Khrushchev's reforms and changes – they are beginning to take place only now. Buyanov describes the world of psychiatrists that he knows so well: whether they go mad, whether they are often killed, and what psychiatry is in general (the author believes that in many respects this science is "surprising and enigmatic") and what is anti-psychiatry. The author tries to answer the questions – were Lenin, Ivan the Terrible and Salieri sick? Did Salieri really kill Mozart or did he simply slander himself in a fit of madness?

Buyanov reflects upon the nature of magnetism, lethargy, and telepathy. Is it possible, for example, to hypnotize a patient and then make him kill and rape? Have such cases taken place? All these questions have been answered in the bopok by the psychiatrist who himself knows the secrets of hypnosis. The author also gives the answers to the questions: Did Stalin kill the great scientist Bekhterev? Did the leader suffer from epilepsy or imbecility? Could a mentally healthy person write: "I like to watch how children are dying" as did Mayakovsky? And even to the question: is there life after death? Buyanov is convinced that in some form our existence continues after death.

* * *

One of the most brilliant actresses in the history of American cinema **Katharine Hepburn,** 82, has published a book of her memoirs. During her long career the actress has won the reputation of a rather eccentric lady. In her book she describes her life adventures in minute detail: how she dove stark naked from the wing of a seaplane, how she discovered a huge snake in the drawing-room of her house in Los Angeles. The actress has made her only husband to change his family name. "I didn't want to be called 'Mrs. Smith,'" she explains.

In this book one can also find the recipe for currant pie, and an entire four pages of the book are devoted to the replacement of a tyre-cover.

Despite the purely "personal" character of the notes, the 400 pages of romantic nonsense are generally believed to be a success with readers.

Critics have never particularly favoured the winner of four Oscars, constantly finding different flaws in her appearance and her manner of behaviour. But Hepburn has always been her own harshest critic. "I am a terrible pig," the actress admits in her autobiography.

* * *

The musicians of the Moscow Chamber Orchestra, known for its high reputation and long-suffering fate, have made an unexpected choice – not because 35-year-old **Konstantin Orbelian,** whom they invited to be the artistic director, is a pianist (and not a player on stringed instruments). The main shocker was Orbelian's American citizenship. Nonetheless, the choice of the Orchestra members has been approved by the Moscow Philharmonic Society that has signed the first in its history contract with a foreigner.

They take risks in South Africa and make money



Despite the doubts expressed by his Western partners, **William Slieker,** General Director of the South African automobile plant Supreme Spring System, has decided to do business with the Soviet Union. Slieker was the first among South African businessmen to advertise his enterprise in NT. He was the first to receive numerous responses and to come to Moscow with chief engineer **Noah Perlov** in order to appraise on location the possibilities of the Soviet market and to establish business contacts.

A Dutchman by birth, William Slieker received higher technical education at the Rotterdam Academy of Technical Sciences. He held the post of director at various South African automobile works. In 1984 he was put at the head of the Supreme Spring System.

Noah Perlov emigrated from the USSR to Israel in 1972. He says about the reasons for his move:

"I ran away not from my native land, but from the routine that does not make it possible for a man to do what he can and wants to do. I wanted to have a real business."

He worked for a few years for the Koor concern, became the chief of the planning bureau and headed the electric steel shop. Having arrived in South Africa, he began to work for Africa's largest metallurgical concern, ISCOR, where he rapidly progressed from an engineer to the company's chief mechanic. A year ago he was offered a job as the chief engineer at the Supreme Spring System.

The plant headed by William Slieker designs and manufactures spare parts for automobile suspensions, supplies special springs to most South African plants and exports its products to Europe and the United States. This is the main plant of a company with an annual turnover of 600 million rands (over 200 million dollars). The company has a good reputation in South Africa belonging to the same automobile concern as Toyota and producing everything that motorists cannot do without: springs, shock-absorbers, rubber units, and conditioners.

Slieker is sure that one can do business with the Soviet Union: Noah Perlov thinks that the products of the Supreme Spring System should be available to both Soviet transportation companies and private individuals.

N.Reshetnyak,
NT correspondent
PRETORIA

Konstantin Orbelian was born in San Francisco into an Armenian-Russian family. During the war his mother was sent to Germany as labour force. His father, who had spent some time in fascist captivity, did not venture to return to his native country. He began his career in America as a store cleaner and finished it as the vice president of the US Chamber of Commerce. The career of Orbelian Junior already looked somewhat different. He received his education at the famous Juilliard School of Music where he studied piano and conducting. At 11 he made his debut with the San Francisco Symphony Orchestra, and as a pianist he has today an extensive concert practice in America, Europe, Australia and the USSR. As a conductor, he is making his first steps...

Konstantin has always regarded himself as the son of Soviet people, although he visited the land of his parents only when he was 14. Perhaps for this reason he is not so shaken by the "Soviet" manner of doing business as other foreigners are. He is always ready for a possible frustration and does not rely in the least on the promises of art officials. "I am used to doing everything myself, and I am not lazy," he says. At the same time Orbelian considers himself to be a rather venturesome character. Perhaps it was the combination of these qualities that helped him in 1990 and 1991 to turn such a "hopeless" undertaking as the Palaces of Leningrad International Festival of Chamber Music into a triumph.

Now he has "applied himself" to the Moscow orchestra and intends in the near future to make it competitive on the increasingly capricious world music market.

A.Dolgacheva

* * *

14 years ago **Franco Malerba**, engineer from the Italian town of Busalla, read by chance in one of the British papers an ad by the Europe Space Agency about admission to the school of astronauts. Malerba turned out to be the only Italian among the three thousand male respondents from all over Europe. It seems that his two diplomas – in electrical engineering and physics – have done the trick: Malerba's candidature has been approved.

But then followed a run of bad luck. For the 1983 flight the NASA chose a German astronaut. Then because of the Challenger tragedy and financial difficulties the work on the space programme was put on hold. They have found for Franco, though, a job on the Earth – in the Space Science Department in The Hague.

After some time Italy again became interested in space research. Malerba, who has confirmed his personal interest in the project, has been "brought out of the cold." He has been living in Houston for two years now where the preparation for the new programme Tethered ("The satellite on the leash") is in full swing. The Italian satellite put into orbit by the Shuttle will be connected to it by a 20-kilometer-long "leash." The scientists are planning to study the magnetic field of the Earth and to conduct experiments on the generation of electricity.

Franco says that pending the flight he is constantly tormented by thoughts about the count down – those last moments before the launching when the future astronaut can hear: "Five, four, three, two..." It very seldom happens that the launching of a spaceship goes without a hitch the first time, and Franco can hardly imagine whether he will be able to stand the stress when he will have to listen to the count down two or three times. He is reassured by his colleagues who have already been to outer space: the "sixth sense" usually helps one to determine whether the launching will take place or whether everything will have to be started all over again.

The Lutheran who came in from the cold

Alexander Fits, 43, president of the Synod of the United Evangelical Lutheran Church of Russia, dreams of taking the clock from the KGB building and taking the organ from the 1st Moscow crematorium. Alexander Fits has been fighting for a whole year already with the *Diafilm* firm for the return to the church of the St.Peter and Paul Lutheran Cathedral to which the said clock and organ belong.

Alexander was born in Kazakhstan where in 1941 his parents were moved from the Ukraine. On the day of his birth he was registered in the Aktyubinsk Region NKVD. Like thousands of other Germans in the USSR, he was given his freedom in 1956 when Stalin's repressive acts were partially rescinded.

Fits tried a lot of professions: he worked as a metalworker, engine-driver's assistant, and clicker in a printing-house.

"Till recently, not many Russian Germans managed to take the post above that of a team leader," says Alexander. "It was precisely that legalized third-rate status that provoked me most of all. The thought of submissive concent sickened me."

Having worked for a few years for different publishers in Uzbekistan, in 1981 Fits became the editor-in-chief of the republican newspaper *Komsomolets Uzbekistana*. Five years later, though, he was removed from this post despite the fact that his newspaper had increased its circulation threefold. A German chief was too exotic for the Soviet East. Especially as Fits was not known for his complaisance. More than once the heroes of his feature-stories sued him for libel. Fits won the cases, but in Soviet Central Asia they had different means for bringing pressure to bear on a person...

Fits became a Lutheran and began to believe in God when he wrote a book about the history and sad fate of Germans in the USSR. Upon sending scores of inquiries to the archives of the Interior Ministry, the KGB, and many civilian organizations in order to receive information, among other things, about the fate of his relatives, he learned that some of them had been shot because of their German descent and their loyalty to the Lutheran faith even before the Second World War. Others were sent to prisons or exiled. He also learned that his great-grandfather had been a minister and his grandfather – the head of a Lutheran commune. And it was at that point that Alexander decided that he had to come back to the faith of his ancestors and save it at least for his children. He is convinced that only faith can stop the spiritual degradation of his people.

Introduced by
New Times analyst
Rostislav Zolotaryov

We have already presented works of almost all ideological and political trends, ranging from Christian Socialists to left-wing radicals. However, no work of anarchism has so far been presented.

Today we are going to compensate for this absence by publishing an abstract from a book of reminiscences about the Russian Revolution written by Alexander Berkman, or Sasha Berkman as he often signed his works. Alexander (Yevsei Osipovich) Berkman was born in Vilno (now Vilnius). A contemporary of Vladimir Lenin, he familiarized himself with socialist ideas very early, but the idea of anarchism attracted him more than any other. The extreme radicalism of the anarchist teaching and revolt against various forms of opposition often made anarchists nigh on socialists. However, as soon as it came to the establishment of a monopoly on power – as the Bolsheviks had done in Russia – the anarchists quickly separated themselves from their allies, even the pro-socialism anarchists like Sasha Berkman.

Sasha Berkman had already been a foreigner by the time of the 1917 October revolution – he had emigrated to America at the age of 17. Two years later he got acquainted with Emma Goldman, an emigrant from Kovno (Kaunas), who became his wife and comrade in political struggle. Both were convicted in the United States for an attempted terrorist attack organized by their anarchist cell. Having spent thirteen years in prison the Berkmans rejected the violent methods of struggle, but stayed loyal to anarchism as an ideological movement, although they joined the pacifist movement. Sasha Berkman feared that the war would result in large-scale social catastrophes and outbursts of violence. His worst expectations were confirmed after the October 1917 events in Russia. The Berkmans left for Russia in 1919. The weak hope that the revolution would emancipate the people and give freedom to the people's initiative soon vanished. Berkman saw the Thermidor of the Russian Revolution in the events of 1921 when the Bolsheviks brutally cracked down on uprisings in Petrograd and across Russia.

The differences between Berkman and some Bolshevik leaders whom Berkman had managed to associate himself with, were quickly deepening. Alexander refused to translate Lenin's work *Left-Wing" Communism – An Infantile Disorder* into English. He was one of the first to inform the West about prisons and concentration camps and to publish letters from Soviet convicts... He had to leave Russia in 1922. After several years of wandering across Europe the Berkmans returned to America. In 1936 Alexander decided that his "life in revolution" was through and committed suicide...

Today on the eve of the anniversary of the tragic events of October 1917 it is useful to read abrstracts from Berkman's *The Bolshevik Myth...*

Compiled by
Ivan Zadorozhnyuk

FROM THE XXth CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT

The Bolshevik myth

Alexander Berkman (1870–1936)

Yesterday Lenin sent his auto for me, and I drove to the Kremlin. Times have changed, indeed: the old stronghold of the Romanovs is now the homes of "Ilyitch" (popular patronymic of Lenin), of Trotsky, Lunatcharsky, and other prominent Communists. The place is guarded as in the days of the Tsar; armed soldiers at the gates, at every buildings and entrance, scrutinize those entering and carefully examine their "documents." Externally everything seems as before, yet I felt something different in the atmosphere, something symbolic of the great change that has taken place. I sensed a new spirit in the bearing and looks of the people, a new will and huge energy tumultuously seeking an outlet, yet ineffectively exhausting themselves in a chaotic struggle against multiplying barriers.

Like the living sentinels aboutl me, thoughts crowded my mind as the machine sped toward the quarters of the great man of Russia. In bold relief stood out my experiences in the country of the Revolution: I saw much that was wrong and evil, the dangerous tendency to bureaucracy, the inequality and injustice. But Russia – I am convinced – would outgrow these evils with the return of a more ordered life, if the Allies would cease their interference and lift the blockade. The important thing is, the Revolution has not been merely political, but deeply social and economical. Some private ownership still exists, it is true, but its extent is insignificant. As a system, Capitalism has been uprooted – that is the great achievement of the Revolution. But Russia must learn to work, to apply her energies, to be effective. She should not wait for miraculous aid from beyond, for revolutions in the West: with her own strength she must organize her resources, increase production, and satisfy the fundamental needs of her people. Above all, opportunity to exercise popular initiative and creativeness will be vitally stimulating.

Lenin greeted me warmly. He is below medium height and bald; his narrow blue eyes have a steady look, a sly twinkle in their corners... If there is any trace of Hamlet in him, it is reduced to passivity by logic and cold reasoning. Lenin's strength is intellectual, that of the profound conviction of an unimaginative nature. Trotsky is different. I remember our first meeting in America: it was in New York, in the days of the Kerensky régime. He impressed me as a character strong by nature rather than by conviction, one who could remain unbending even if he felt himself in the wrong.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is vital, Lenin emphasized. It is the *sine qua non* of the revolutionary period, and must be furthered by all and every means. To my contention that popular initiative and active interest are essential to the success of the Revolution, he replied that only the Communist Party could lead Russia out of the chaos of conflicting tendencies and interests. *Liberty,* he said, *is a luxury not to be permitted* at the present stage of development. When the Revolution is out of danger, external and domestic, *then free speech might be indulged in. The current conception of liberty is a bourgeois prejudice,* to say the least. Petty middle-class ideology confuses revolution with liberty; in reality, the Revolution is a matter of securing the supremacy of the proletariat. Its enemies must be

crushed, and *all power centralized in the Communist State.* In this process the Government is often compelled to resort to unpleasant means; but that is the imperative of the situation, from which there can be no shrinking. In the course of time these methods will be abolished, when they have become unnecessary.

"The peasant doesn't like us," Lenin chuckled, as if at some pleasantry. "They are backward and strongly imbued with the sense of private ownership. That spirit must be discouraged and eradicated. Besides, the great majority are illiterate, though we have been making educational progress in the village. They don't understand us. When we shall be able to satisfy their demands for farm implements, salt, nails, and other necessaries, then they will be on our side. More work and greater production – that's our pressing need."

Referring to the Resolution of the Moscow Anarchists, Lenin said that the Executive Committee had discussed the matter, and would soon take action upon ait. "We do not persecute Anarchists of ideas," he emphasized, "but we will not tolerate armed resistance or agitation of that character..."

The demon of Communist revolution does not destroy the old regime's machine of coersion alone, but also all the positive experience acquired before. What is even worst – it creates a new, more horrible, machine of repressions and enslavement

The total impression I carried away was that of a man of clarity of view and set purpose. Not necessarily a big man, but one of strong mind and unbending will. An unemotional logician, intellectually flexible and courageous enough to mold his methods to the requirements of the moment, but always keeping his final objective in clear sight. "A practicval idealist" bent upon the realization of his Communist dream *by whatever means,* and subordinating to it every ethical and humanitarian consideration. A man sincerely convinced that evil methods may serve a good purpose and be justified by it. A Jesuit of the Revolution who would force mankind to become free in accordance with his interpretation of Marx. In short, a *thoroughgoing revolutionist* in the sense of Netchayev, *one who would sacrifice the greater part of mankind* – if need be – to secure the triumph of the Social Revolution.

A fanatic? Most certainly. What is a fanatic but a man whose faith is impregnable to doubt? It is the faith that moves mountains, the faith that accomplishes. Revolutions are not made by Hamlets. The traditional "great" man, the "big personality" of current conception, may give to the world new thoughts, noble vision, inspiration. But the man that "sees every side" cannot lead, cannot control. He is too conscious of the fallibility of all theories, even of thought itself, to be a fighter in any cause.

Lenin is a fighter – revolutionary leaders must be such. In this sense Lenin is great – in his oneness with himself, in his single-mindedness; in his psychic positiveness that is as *self-sacrificial* as it is *ruthless to others,* in the full assurance that only his plan can save mankind...

Then came Kronstadt (Anti-Bolshevik rebellion of the Russian Navy units on the Baltic in 1921 – **Ed.**) and its simultaneous echoes throughout the land. For years the people had suffered untold misery, privation, and hunger. For the sake of the Revolution they were still willing to bear and to suffer. Not for bread did they cry. Only for a breath of life, of liberty.

Kronstadt could have easily turned its guns against Petrograd and driven out the Bolshelvik masters who were frightened and on the verge of flight. One decisive blow by the sailors, and Petrograd would have been theirs and with it Moscow. The entire country was ready to welcome the step. Never before were the Bolsheviki nearer to destruction. But Kronstadt, like the rest of Russia, did not intend war on the Soviet Republic. It wanted no bloodshed, it would not fire the first shot. Kronstadt demanded only honest elections, Soviets free from Communist domination. It proclaimed the slogans of October and revived the true spirit of the Revolution.

Kronstadt was crushed as ruthlessly as Thiers and Galliffet slaughtered the Paris Communards. And with Kronstadt the entire country and its last hope. With it also my faith in the Bolsheviki. That day I broke finally, irrevocably, with the Communists. It became clear to me that never, under any circumstances, could I accept that degradation of human personality and liberty, that Party chauvinism and State absolutism which had become the essence of the Communist dictatorship. I realized at last that Bolshevik idealism was a MYTH, a dangerous delusion fatal to liberty and progress.

The October Revolution was not the legitimate offspring of traditional Marxism. Russia but little resembled a country in which, according to Marx, "centralization of the means of production and socialization of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder."

In Russia "the shell" burst unexpectedly. It burst at a stage of low technical and industrial development, when centralization of production had made little progress. Russia was a country with a badly organized system of transportation, with an insignificant bourgeoisie and weak proletariat, but with a numerically strong and socially important peasant population. It was a country in which, apparently, there could be no talk of "irreconcilable antagonism between the grown industrial labor forces and a fully ripened capitalist system."

But the combination of circumstances in 1917 involved, particularly for Russia, an exceptional state of affairs which resulted in the catastrophic breakdown of her whole industrial system. "It was easy," Lenin justly wrote at the time, "to begin the revolution in the peculiarly unique situation of 1917."

The specially favorable conditions were: (1) the possibility of blending the slogans of the Social Revolution with the popular demand for the termination of the imperialistic world war, which had produced great exhaustion and dissatisfaction among the masses; (2) the chance of remaining, at least for a certain period, outside the sphere of influence of the capitalistic European groups which continued the war, (3) the opportunity to begin, even during the short time of this respite, the work of internal organization and to prepare the foundation for revolutionary reconstruction; (4) the unusually favorable position of Russia, in case of new aggression on the part of West European imperialism, due to her vast territory and insufficient means of communication; (5) the advantages of such a condition in the event of civil war; and (6) the possibility of almost immediately satisfying the demands of the peasantry for land, notwithstanding the fact that the essentially democratic view-

point of the agricultural population was entirely different from the Socialist program of the *Party of the proletariat* which seized the reins of government.

Moreover, revolutionary Russia already had the benefit of a great experience – that of 1905, when the Tsarist autocracy succeeded in crushing the revolution for the very reason that the latter strove to be exclusively political and therefore could neither arouse the peasants nor inspire even a considerable part of the proletariat.

The world war, by exposing the complete bankruptcy of constitutional government, served to prepare and quicken the greatest movement of the people – a movement which, by virtue of its very essence, could develop only into a social revolution.

Anticipating the measures of the government, often even in defiance of the latter, the revolutionary masses by their own initiative began, long before the October days, to put in practice their social ideals. They took possession of the land, the factories, mines, mills, and the tools of production. They got rid of the more hated and dangerous representatives of government and authority. In their grand revolutionary outburst they destroyed every form of political and economic oppression. In the deeps of Russia the processes of the Social Revolution were intensively at work even before the October change took place in Petrograd and Moscow.

Communism with its one-party dictatorship and total state control, secret police and privileges of bureaucrats will never be able to become the point of departure towards a free society, a society without despotism and violence

The Communist Party, aiming at the dictatorship, from the very beginning correctly judged the situation. Throwing overboard the democratic planks of its platform, it proclaimed the slogans of the Social Revolution in order to gain control of the movement of the masses. In the course of the development of the Revolution, the Bolsheviki gave concrete form to certain fundamental principles and methods of Anarchist Communism, as for instance: the negation of parliamentarism, expropriation of the bourgeoisie, tactics of direct action, seizure of the means of production, establishment of the system of Workers' and Peasants' Councils (Soviets).

The fundamental characteristic of Bolshevik psychology is distrust of the masses. Left to themselves, the people – according to the Bolsheviki – can rise only to the consciousness of the petty reformer. The masses must be made free by force. To calculate them to liberty one must not hesitate to use compulsion and violence. The road that leads to liberty was therefore forsaken.

"Proletarian compulsion in all its forms," as Bukharin, one of the foremost Communist theoreticians wrote, "beginning with summary execution and ending with compulsory labor is, however paradoxical it may sound, a method of reworking the human material of the capitalistic epoch into Communist humanity."

Already in the first days of the Revolution, early in 1918, when Lenin first announced to the world his socio-economic program in its minutest details, the roles of the people and of the Party in the revolutionary reconstruction were strictly separated and definitely assigned. On the one hand, an absolutely submissive Socialist herd, a dumb people; on the other, the omniscient, all-controlling Political Party. What is inscrutable to everyone is an open book to It. There is only *one* indisputable source of truth – the State. But the Communist State is, in essence and practice, the dictatorship of its Central Committee. Every citizen must be, first and foremost, the servant of the State, its obedient functionary unquestioningly executing the will of his master. All free initiative, of the individual as well as of the collectivity, is eliminated from the vision of the State. The people's Soviets are transformed into sections of the ruling Party; the Soviet institutions become soulless offices, mere transmitters of the will of the center to the periphery. All expressions of State activity must be stamped with the approving seal of Communism as interpreted by the faction in power. Everything else is considered superfluous, useless, and dangerous.

By its declaration *L'etat c'est moi,* the Bolshevik dictatorship assumed entire responsibility for the Revolution in all its historic and ethical implications.

The system of Bolshevism – a system of unprecedented shamelessness practiced on a monster scale, a policy of outrageous double-dealing in which the left hand of the Communist Party consciously ignores and even denies, on principle, what its right hand is doing; when, for instance, it is proclaimed that the most important problem of the moment is the struggle against the small bourgeoisie (and, incidentally, in stereotyped Bolshevik phraseology, against Anarchist elements), while on the other hand are issued new decrees creating the techno-economic and psychological conditions necessary for the restoration and strengthening of that same bourgeoisie – that is the Bolshevik policy which will forever stand as a monument of the thoroughly false, thoroughly contradictory, concerned only in self-preservation opportunistic policy of the Communist Party dictatorship.

However loudly that dictatorship may boast about the great success of its political methods, it remains the most tragic fact that the worst and most incurable wounds of the Revolution were received at the hands of the Communist dictatorship itself...

Its distinctive features – inherent social antagonisms – are abolished only formally in the Soviet Republic. In reality those antagonisms exist and are very deep-seated. The exploitation of labor, the enslavement of the worker and peasant, the cancellation of the citizen as a human being, as a personality, and his transformation into a microscopic part of the universal economic mechanism owned by the government; the creation of privileged groups favored by the State; the system of labor service and its punitive organs – these are the characteristics of Bolshevism.

Bolshevism, with its Party dictatorship and State Communism, is not and *can never become the threshold of a free, non-authoritarian Communist society,* because the very essence and nature of governmental, compulsory Communism excludes such an evolution. Its economic and political centralization, its governmentalization and bureaucratization of every sphere of activity and effort, its inevitable militarization and degradation of the human spirit mechanically destroy every germ of new life and extinguish the stimuli of creative, constructive work...

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